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JPRS Report

Arms Control

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

GORBACHEV BAYKONUR SPEECH AGAINST SCIENTIFIC 'INFERIORITY COMPLEX'

PM141029 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 May 87 Second Edition pp 1, 2

[TASS report: "To Be Patriots of the Motherland, To Live and Work Conscientiously, M.S. Gorbachev's Speech at Meeting With Working People From the Town of Leninsk"--PRAVDA headline]

[Excerpts] Dear Comrades! Permit me to cordially greet you on behalf of the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government, and to thank you for your shock labor, for your persistence, and for your creative labor on behalf of our homeland.

All of us Soviet people have always pronounced the word "Baykonur" with special emotion. It has become a symbol of our homeland's greatest exploit -- a triumph of Soviet science and the great potential of the socialist social system.

Here, in the boundless steppes of Kazakhstan, one experiences a sense of pride in the intellect and deeds of Soviet people and in our Soviet fatherland. It is here one senses more strongly the greatness and might of the Land of October and its immense achievements which have crowned the 70-year path of the peoples of our great multinational state since the October Socialist Revolution.

It was from here mankind first stepped into outer space, opening a new page in the history of civilization. It was from here at Baykonur, in October 1957, that the first artificial earth satellite -- a symbol of revolutionary science and technology -- was put into orbit. It was from here, on 12 April 1961, that man's first flight into space was carried out -- the remarkable flight by our countryman Yuriy Alekseyevich Gagarin. These are all great landmarks in the development of Soviet science and technology.

Created by the labor and talent of Soviet scientists, workers, engineers, and military specialists, the unique scientific research testing complex is the true embodiment of Lenin's dream of turning our state into a great industrial power.

In essence what is concentrated here is the intellectual capacity and the final results of the work of many dozens of our country's scientific research and design organizations and major machine-building enterprises. It is a real testing ground for advanced engineering thinking. I would say that in all main areas it is equipped with the most up-to-date science and technology.

I would like to single out in particular the following: Everything here at the space center, from the most complex launch facilities, testing facilities, and laboratories to the powerful carrier rockets, space apparatus, and their life support systems equipped with modern computers and highly sensitive instruments -- all this has been produced by us in the USSR. It is all high-quality and state of the art technology.

Once again a simple but very important question comes to mind: Why do we at times try to acquire even simple items from abroad if we are today capable of resolving such vast, large-scale and complex tasks? Everything seen here leads once again to the deep conviction: There is no reason for us to go abroad, but in hand in this way. No embargoes, no ban imposed by certain foreign circles on selling us technology and equipment will slow down the development of our country or the implementation of the great social and economic plans connected with restructuring and the acceleration of our economy.

This once again convinces me of the need to give every support to our science, our scientific intelligentsia, engineers, and designers.

On the other hand, it is necessary to strengthen demands, to put an end to a kind of inferiority complex, to actually develop the immense scientific potential we have accumulated over the 70 years of Soviet power. This is within our reach; and this, Comrades, is one of the central tasks of restructuring.

Speaking of achievements in space, one senses the living continuity of generations. In today's conversations we often remember those who began this great work 30 years ago which placed our country in the forefront of scientific and technical progress. Indeed, the major scientists and designers of our country have always worked in the field of missile and space technology.

Academicians Korolev, Keldysh, Yangel, Chelomey, Pilyugin, and other outstanding specialists in many areas of science and technology were at the origins of Soviet space research. These people did not spare themselves in their work. They did not pursue fame, for the main thing to them was not personal honors and comfort, but the might and prosperity of our homeland. They were people of high socialist morality. When we speak of the present and of our tasks, I believe it is appropriate to say a good word for these specialists. They were ahead of their time in their ideas and their views. They were truly the pioneers of the scientific and technical revolution.

A great constellation of their heirs and students, who are continuing their work with confidence and are holding high the banner of Soviet science, are in this hall today. On behalf of the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government, I would like to greet you all. We highly value your outstanding contribution to resolving the greatest of scientific and technical problems of our development.

From this platform I would particularly like to greet the Soviet cosmonauts. Work in space demands the utmost in training, the most profound knowledge, and the greatest qualities of will and morale.

Soviet cosmonauts have to their credit the world's longest space flight and at the present time a whole space laboratory is functioning in near earth orbit. This is in itself a very telling fact. We can already see new stages in our peaceful development of space: the Mir station, the Kvant scientific module and the Soyuz and Progress-29 craft, where Yuriy Romanenko and Aleksandr Laveykin are keeping their difficult vigil. Let us from here, from Baykonur, greet our cosmonauts. Let us also greet all those who carry out flight preparations and guarantee the success of work in space, and who work around the clock for the sake of all this. This is at times exhausting and very difficult, responsible work.

There is no distinction between main and auxiliary work here. It can be said that all are equal, in the sense that much, indeed almost everything, depends on each individual. The most important thing is the result. No mistakes may be made either in large or small things. This is an example for all Soviet people, an example we need very much now at a time when society has set the performance of fresh tasks. The fresh tasks cannot be achieved using the old approaches and the old level of knowledge and vocational training. We all need to work the way people work at the space center to perform the tasks at hand. We need to be patriots, to live and work conscientiously and competently carry out the task we have been assigned.

An acquaintance with your work has further vast significance, a significance of great political importance. What is happening here and the fact that the solution of such very difficult problems is within your abilities convinces me the tasks set for our science and technology, and above all for Soviet machine building, by the 27th congress are within our powers and that they will be fulfilled. This is the key sector which will enable our economy to be raised to new heights, to a new technical level and to greater savings of resources in the work of all branches of the national economy. Without that, Comrades, there can be no acceleration.

We have gained much from research aimed at the peaceful conquest of space. We are also faced with tasks which we must contemplate. How are we to make the yield from space more weighty both for science and for the whole national economy? This is the practical task with which we are faced today in all its magnitude. We must switch more boldly from experiments and research work to the planned and wide-ranging application of existing opportunities in the interests of the country's socioeconomic development. From the USSR Academy of Sciences, the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology, the USSR Main Space Administration, [Glavkosmos] and all the ministries and departments concerned we expect considered and viable proposals on expanding the application of the achievements of space technology in the national economy.

Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev also stressed the defense significance of the work being carried out by the labor collectives at Baykonur. He said: Our policy of a peaceful space is not a sign of weakness. It is an expression of the Soviet Union's peace-loving foreign policy. We are proposing to the international community cooperation in the conquest of peaceful space. This is receiving a positive response worldwide.

We oppose the arms race, including in space. Feverish efforts are now being undertaken by U.S. ruling circles to create obstacles to the progress which has taken shape in the search for an accord. It is now a crucial moment in the development of the world situation, and we must act dynamically and with careful consideration. We shall undertake all that is necessary to achieve real progress.

Our interests here coincide with the interests of the American people and with the interests of the other peoples of the world. They do not coincide with the interests of those who make a business out of the arms race and who want to achieve military superiority through space. You are conversant with our latest proposals, including those that deal with clearing Europe of nuclear weapons. It is up to the United States and the NATO countries. They must now show what their policy, which they have been advertising for so many years, is worth, and what their statements on these questions are worth.

Now it is important as never before for the world public and all progressive forces to rise to the struggle against the forces which do not want disarmament. Everything that concerns the arms race is now so serious that the world is at a crossroad. In which direction will the world go? That is the question. The task is not to miss the chance which is opening up thanks to our policy, which is full of initiative. It is supported by broad circles in the world. We will act consistently to improve international relations.

Any lofty talk about defense against nuclear weapons is the greatest deception of the peoples. It is precisely from these positions that we evaluate the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative which the U.S. Administration is seeking to implement. SDI is not only robbery of the taxpayers, it is a senseless venture from the viewpoint of defense. What is the greatest danger of SDI we must know about? It destroys strategic stability. The arms race passes into space, which will whip up even more the arms race on earth. But is this really the world for which we all are striving? It is a world in which something unpredictable could always happen, where the possibilities of dangerous situations will increase, arising not by virtue of political decisions but by virtue of malfunctioning equipment. We are categorically against transferring the arms race to space.

We see it as our duty to point out the serious danger of SDI to the whole world. We are confident we are acting in the interests of the Soviet people and in the interests of other peoples. We appeal to everyone to act. We are acting hand in hand with the socialist countries. I have no doubt that the conference of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee to be held at the end of May will have its say on this matter. People are alarmed at the situation in the world. Opposition to militarism is growing, and we highly value the efforts of the international public in the struggle against the danger of war.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

TASS CRITICIZES SOFAER REPORT ON ABM TREATY

'Casuistic Interpretation'

LD150202 Moscow TASS in English 0130 GMT 15 May 87

["Pentagon Eager To Place Arms in Space" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow May 14 TASS -- By TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev:

In an interview to the NBC television network U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger recently admitted that the further attempts of jurists of the State Department to substantiate the correspondence of the U.S. "Star Wars" program to the spirit and letter of the treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems are doomed to failure and will only carry the Reagan administration to a slippery road. Therefore without further ado the Pentagon's chief proposed to start the militarisation of space regardless of who said what in 1972.

But a fire of criticism under which the plans for the militarisation of space came in the USA, warnings of a number of influential American legislators about the possibility of a confrontation between the Congress and the White House about financing of the "Strategic Defense Initiative" compelled the administration to look again for arguments in defense of its "broader interpretation" of the 1972 treaty in the juridical area. Legal adviser to the State Department Abraham Sofaer who had blundered earlier, was instructed to look for fresh approach and interpretation in defense of SDI.

As it should have been expected, the new report of the Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State, is compiled in such a way as to draw the conclusion about the legality of the preparation for "Star Wars" and declares that the U.S. program for large-scale ABM is in keeping with the provisions of the 1972 treaty. As refers "freshness of approach" in the new report, it amounts to the fact that casuistic interpretation of absolutely unambiguous provisions of the text of the treaty is "borne up" with references to tendentiously selected pronouncements of Soviet participants in the talks, to "erroneous conclusions" of U.S. legislators and the failure of senators to grasp "certain nuances" during the discussion at the ratification of the Soviet-U.S. agreement.

In the 1985 report Sofaer and his team tried to distort the contents of agreed Statement D aimed at ensuring the implementation by the parties of their pledge not to deploy any ABM systems and their components except for a limited number of stationary land-based ABM systems in a limited area having a radius of one hundred and fifty

kilometres. The new work by Sofaer contains the conclusion that agreed Statement D was "superfluous" and that it was almost by chance that it was included in the text. Contrary to this agreed statement, the authors of the report exert themselves to prove the "legality" of the creation and testing of ABM systems based on new physical principles -- laser beam, etc -- outside the limits of the area stipulated by the treaty.

It is characteristic that the authors of the report avoided using the word "space", apparently trying to gloss over their plans of the militarisation of near-earth space. And the plans of "Star Wars" envisage the deployment of hundreds and even thousands of units of strike arms in space. Meanwhile, under Article Five of the ABM Treaty each party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based.

At a news conference on the occasion of the report's publication Paul Nitze, consultant to the President, and Abraham Sofaer, legal adviser to the State Department, declared that President Reagan is thoroughly studying the question of the United States adopting a "broader interpretation" of the ABM Treaty. They refused to answer questions of newsmen if the tests of new ABM systems planned by the Pentagon will violate the provisions of the Soviet-U.S. treaty.

Fearing, apparently, indignation of the public, the U.S. Administration decided to present the world its decision to turn outer space into an arena of the race of lethal armaments not at once but bit-by-bit.

'Scuttling' Treaty

LD140922 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0355 GMT 14 May 87

[Excerpts] Washington, 14 May (TASS) -- TASS correspondents Nikolay Turkatenko and Igor Ignatyev report:

The State Department has organized a news conference for a "qualified explanation" of President Reagan's report to Congress on the analysis of the ABM Treaty. It was conducted by P. Nitze, special adviser to the President and the secretary of state on arms control, and by A. Sofaer, the State Department's chief legal adviser. Juggling with out-of-context remarks and statements made by representatives of the USSR and U.S. delegations during the drafting of the ABM Treaty, and referring to the various stages of its ratification in the U.S. Congress, they asserted that there had been no intention to adhere to the "narrow" interpretation on the part of...the Soviet Union. In general, A. Sofaer stated, the "broad" interpretation of the treaty was "totally justified." "There are weighty grounds for a broad interpretation of the treaty," Nitze echoed.

Aiming to damp down the criticism which the report is expected almost certainly to meet with, both in Congress and among the U.S. public, Nitze and Sofaer have assurances that President Reagan was "thoroughly studying" the issue of "whether the SDI program should be reorganized in order to employ the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty," and that the administration was holding "close consultations" on the problem with U.S. allies.

Whatever the upshot of all these "studies" and "consultations", it is already now clear that the report sent by the President to Congress represents a new step in the direction of scuttling the ABM Treaty -- a most important agreement promoting strategic stability not only in relations between the USSR and the United States, but all over the world. They want to distance themselves from it in order to remove all obstacles on the road to implementing SDI.

The depth of alarm in the United States being caused by such prospects is shown by the speeches of many members of the House of Representatives during the discussions on the administration's demand for the allocation of funds for SDI for the 1988 financial year. Thus, J. Hefley (R-Colorado) stressed that the implementation of the "Star Wars" leads to the destruction of the ABM Treaty and the wrecking of the whole process of talks on arms control. Another congressman, R. Dellums (D-California), recalled that it is primarily the Pentagon that is rooting for SDI. He also recalled that 262 members of the House of Representatives have already voted against a "broad" interpretation of the treaty limiting antimissile defense systems, as they understood perfectly well that the testing of any SDI systems in space, not to mention the deployment [razvertyvaniye] of them, will destroy the ABM Treaty. You cannot have both SDI and the ABM Treaty, he stressed.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

TASS HITS WEINBERGER REPORT TO REAGAN ON ABM INTERPRETATION

PM111447 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 May 87 First Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Secret Report Surfaced"]

[Text] New York, 10 May--Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger has sent President Reagan a secret report urging him to proceed to the so-called "broad interpretation" of the Soviet-U.S. ABM Treaty with a view to accelerating the implementation of the space militarization program.

This has been learned by THE NEW YORK TIMES, which reports that the report proposes, in particular, conducting four tests of arms systems in violation of the ABM Treaty in its traditional interpretation. According to THE NEW YORK TIMES, one of these tests would be conducted to verify the U.S. ability to intercept missiles and dummy warheads on the main section of the flight trajectory. It is proposed to intercept them with the help of missiles that destroy the target by force of impact, not with an explosion. During the second test a submarine is to launch a target missile carrying dummy warheads. This experiment is designed for the practical testing of space-based interceptor missiles. A space-based chemical laser would be tested during the third test in 1990. A missile would be launched from Vandenberg Air Base in California within the framework of the fourth test. Then sensors would be used to analyze the question of whether it is possible to distinguish the warheads on that missile from dummy warheads. The report claims that the proposed tests would make it possible to substantially accelerate the realization of SDI. The United States, it says, must either proceed without delay to the new interpretation of the ABM Treaty or renounce it altogether some time later.

The Pentagon report was prepared at a time when an acute struggle is being waged in the U.S. Congress over the question of the size of appropriations for the SDI program in the next fiscal year and over continued U.S. observance of the ABM Treaty. According to commentators, a mighty confrontation is shaping up between the White House and the Congress over these problems and its being fanned by reports that President Reagan intends to veto any bill that limits U.S. military programs.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

TASS HITS WEINBERGER REPORT ON 'CONVENTIONAL' USE OF SDI

LD071326 Moscow TASS in English 1155 GMT 7 May 87

[Text] Washington May 7 TASS -- The Reagan administration's assertions that its notorious "Star Wars" program is "purely defensive" has been effectively disproved by no other than Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger.

In a summary of a classified report he has sent to Senator Dan Quayle, the Pentagon chief said a realization of the "Strategic Defense Initiative" could greatly add to possibilities to employ the entire system as a conventional weapon either on a short-term or a long-term basis.

He said components of the partially space-based missile defense could be used to knock out enemy planes, ships and tanks.

He thus made it clear that an SDI system could be used as an offensive weapon.

This explains very well why in its chase of global military superiority Washington is forging ahead with its ominous program for outer space militarization.

The White House has requested Congress to endorse an unprecedented 5.7 billion dollars in funding for the project in fiscal 1988.

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CSO: 5200/1479

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

SOVIET ARMY PAPER CALLS SDI ADMINISTRATION'S 'PARAMOUNT TASK'

PM140937 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 May 8/ First Edition p 3

[Article by Candidate of Economic Sciences Colonel N. Karasev: "Money for 'Star Wars'"]

[Text] The U.S. ruling circles have elevated the program for the militarization of space to the level of their paramount task. As SDI is implemented it is becoming clearer and clearer that the rapacious appetites of the death-manufacturers are one of its main generators.

As is well known, it is usual to consider the official White House statement announced in March 1983 as the starting point for the SDI program. Yet research done in the United States attests that the "Star Wars" economy emerged much earlier. Major appropriations for the creation [sozdaniye] of prototype space equipment under development [razrabatyvayemaya] in the United States were made back in the immediate postwar years. Even then U.S. military-industrial companies were investing funds in developing [razrabotka] various elements of space weaponry.

Making a complete assessment of the spending on the militarization of near-earth space carried out by the United States before the officially organized formulation of the program is an extremely difficult task. However, it is possible to make a rough estimate. It includes spending on "conventional" ABM systems based on the use of interceptor missiles, antimissile missile launchers, and ABM radar stations; spending on the development [razrabotka] of directed-energy weapons; and spending on the construction and maintenance of test ranges and the creation [sozdaniye] of control and communications systems. In the opinion of U.S. specialists, \$40 billion were spent in the country on these purposes since the start of the work (usually dated to 1954) until R. Reagan's "Star Wars" speech in March 1983.

Pentagon appropriations on military and space research also rocketed in the decades preceding the proclamation of SDI. The U.S. Defense Department spent \$1.4 billion on these purposes in fiscal 1972 and \$8.3 billion in fiscal 1983.

In light of these figures it becomes clear why the U.S. space militarization machine seemed to click into gear with unexpected speed. As can be seen, it had already built up a "head of steam" by March, 1983 and was waiting only for the starting whistle.

The example of the Vought Company is typical. Before the signing of the ABM Treaty the firm conducted work linked with the creation [sozdaniye] of antimissile arms. Subsequently it switched to the development [razrabotka] of the ASAT antisatellite system, which has similarities with previously developed [razrabatyvavshiysya] ABM

elements. It was no accident that Vought was among the first firms to announce its readiness to participate in the SDI program -- its justification being that it had already made a considerable investment in independent preparatory research. The same can be said of the U.S. military-industrial corporation Bell Aviation, which back in the heyday of the "cold war" participated in financing the development [razrabotka] of satellites armed with nuclear weapons.

Since SDI was put forward universal attention has been focused on the financing of the program, which includes five areas officially announced by the White House: detection, interception, tracking, and evaluation of target kills; directed-energy weapons; kinetic weapons; analysis of combat operations systems and combat control; and research and development systems.

Thus, in fiscal 1984 expenditure on the implementation of the aforesaid projects amounted to slightly more than \$1 billion; in fiscal 1987 this indicator has already reached \$3.6 billion. For fiscal 1988 the R. Reagan administration has asked Congress for \$5.6 billion to cover the same five programs. According to White House requests the sum will have to grow to \$6.8 billion in a year's time -- fiscal 1989.

However, according to calculations by the Congressional Budget Office, the number of areas in which the development [razrabotka] of space weapons is being conducted and that are actually being financed today is six times higher than what was officially announced within the "Strategic Defense Initiative" framework. Direct investment in SDI is only the tip of the iceberg. Thus, it is under other headings that the Pentagon is paying for the creation [sozdaniye] of the ERIS [Exo-atmospheric Reentry Interceptor System] "exo-atmospheric" ABM interception system, the ground-launched HEDI [High Endo-atmospheric Defense Interceptor] missile interception system, and various types of "exotic" systems such as laser and particle-beam weapons. The U.S. Department of Energy is independently developing [razrabotka] directed-energy weapons. NASA continues to spend up to one-third of its budget appropriations on military developments [razrabotka]. According to specialists in Congress the combined annual expenditure on all these space arms race projects that are not formally included in SDI will be equal to the appropriations for the implementation of the officially announced programs.

Specialists are defining the present stage of the economic, scientific, and technical implementation of the "Star Wars" idea as the preproduction development [razrabotka] of its main technological components, with some of them being brought to the experimental mockup stage.

The expediting of the preproduction stage of the creation [sozdaniye] of combat space equipment opens up major additional channels for military financing. Among the most obvious of these is the growth in U.S. purchases of electronic systems for the implementation of the "Star Wars" program. Thus, USAF spending alone on the acquisition of various types of electronic equipment directly for the launch of mockups of military space equipment in the current fiscal year amounts to \$3.2 billion as against \$2.7 billion in fiscal 1986. It is important to bear in mind that spending on electronics, for all their enormous importance, on the whole does not exceed half of the total cost of the most modern aircraft.

Those whipping up "Star Wars" need one such craft right now, before series production of military space equipment begins. It is a question of a cargo ship intended for putting combat space systems into orbit. After last year's "Challenger" disaster the

United States stepped up investment in developing [razrabotka] replacements. The Pentagon and military industrialists have currently embarked on the creation [sozdaniye] of a giant new rocket -- a "space truck." In the opinion of specialists in the U.S. aerospace industry the project will require \$20-40 billion in production investment. The recreated ship itself will sell for \$2.8 billion.

Thus, a by no means complete list of items to be financed under the "Star Wars" program creates the firm impression that we are dealing with the "snowball" principle -- the further it rolls, the bigger it gets. One could also say that the more the space arms race is whipped up, the more and more funds will find their way into the hands of those who deal in the business of weapons.

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CSO: 5200/1479

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR: REAGAN DISPUTES WITH CONGRESS ON SDI, ASAT FUNDING

Reagan 'Exasperated'

LD122148 Moscow TASS in English 2046 GMT 12 May 87

[Text] Washington May 12 TASS -- TASS correspondent Andrey Fedyashin reports:

President Ronald Reagan of the United States made it clear today that his administration was exasperated by the endeavours of the Democratic majority in Congress to stop the uncontrolled increase in appropriations for the Pentagon and to compel the White House legislatively to make, at last, specific positive steps in the field of arms control.

Appropriate amendments have already been endorsed by the U.S. House of Representatives which continues to discuss its version of a military spending bill for the 1988 fiscal year. On Wednesday a similar debate will begin in the Senate as well.

During a meeting with the Republican leadership of Congress in the White House on Tuesday, the President threatened to veto any final congressional military budget bill which would not meet the administration's requirements.

He said he would have to veto any legislation which would jeopardise U.S. efforts in the field of arms cuts or undermine U.S. national security.

The greatest discontent of the White House has been aroused by the endorsement by the U.S. House of Representatives last week of amendments urging the administration to observe the strategic arms limits set by the SALT-2 treaty and strictly to adhere to the provisions of the 1972 Soviet-U.S. ABM Treaty.

House Blocks SDI Increase

LD130146 Moscow TASS in English 2233 GMT 12 May 87

[Text] Washington May 12 TASS -- The House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress today rejected by the overwhelming majority of votes the attempt of the Reagan administration to get an increase in the appropriations for the Reagan "Star Wars" programme. Congressmen blocked the amendment which envisaged the increase of the funds for SDI in the 1988 financial year to 4.1 billion dollars. The House Armed Services Committee suggested that 3.6 billion dollars be appropriated for the purpose. It is characteristic that during the voting against this amendment 55 congressmen from the Republican Party voted alongside Democrats. The House of Representatives continues discussing separate aspects of its version of the bill on the United States military expenditures for the next financial year. The debates on SDI programme are held today. [sentence as received]

'Ultimatum' on ASAT

LD131442 Moscow TASS in English 1338 GMT 13 May 87

[Text] Washington, May 13 TASS -- By TASS correspondent Nikolay Turkatenko:

On Tuesday, on that same day that the U.S. House of Representatives reaffirmed its determination to cut the funds requested by the administration for the "Star Wars" programme, the White House issued its white paper, in which it expresses a demand in the form of an ultimatum that the legislators appropriate "adequate funds" for the 1988 fiscal year for a further intensification of research and development and deployment of anti-satellite weapons. The white paper also contains the demand addressed to the congress on behalf of the President that the ban be lifted on the testing of that weapon in outer space.

In his foreword to the white paper Reagan admits that the administration had suffered major defeats in Congress on the issue of anti-satellite weapons. Indeed, most of the congressmen see in the plans to deploy an anti-satellite weapons system not only a threat of transfer of the weapons race into outer space contrary to the international agreements signed by the USA itself, but also a potential threat to their country's own security. Such fears grew after, in addition to the programme for the creation and deployment of anti-satellite weapons, Reagan put forward in March 1983 an even more dangerous and destabilizing programme named "Strategic Defence Initiative".

Authoritative experts of many countries, including American experts, have proved that the development of anti-satellite systems (ASAT) is directly connected with the attempts of the USA at spreading the weapons race into outer space. This has also been admitted by General R. Rankin, a leading official of the ASAT programme, who said in March 1987, that one of the areas of work in that field is directly linked with SDI.

In pressuring the legislators once again, President Reagan is again having recourse to his favourite gimmick which is so often used in pushing armament programmes through Congress: he is referring to the mythical "Soviet menace", specifying it today as some "Soviet space threat". In so doing the U.S. chief executive claimed that the Soviet Union has the world's only operating ASAT system.

Yet the U.S. President cannot but know that the Soviet Union ended its ASAT system's testing way back in 1982 and undertook not to [word indistinct] should the USA give up testing too. It is precisely after that that the U.S. Congress prohibited the administration to carry on the testing of anti-satellite weapons trained on space objects.

ABM Treaty Interpretation

LD140859 Moscow World Service in English 0700 GMT 14 May 87

[Text] The United States, as President Reagan maintains in a report to Congress, can test space weapons. In the opinion of the White House, this is compatible with the treaty with the Soviet Union restricting the systems of antimissile defense. But the agreement, which has been signed and ratified, unambiguously bans tests or deployment of new ABM systems or their components on land, sea, and in space. Observers regard the report as an attempt to torpedo an important treaty promoting strategic stability in the world. In a bid to cease abiding by it, the Reagan administration is seeking to step up the program of Star Wars, and with the help of space weapons to obtain strategic superiority over the Soviet Union.

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CSO: 5200/1479

CANADA: PARTICIPATION IN U.S. SPACE STATION EXAMINED

SUN Editorial

Vancouver THE SUN in English 10 Apr 87 p B4

[Editorial: "This Is No Space for Military Uses"]

[Text]

The federal government should break off negotiations for Canadian participation in the proposed American space station until the United States government decides once and for all what it is to be used for.

The pressure from the U.S. defence department for a military role for the station has become so intense that before proceeding further, Canada should demand an ironclad guarantee it will be used only for peaceful purposes.

The Canadian government agreed to resume negotiations two months ago after the U.S. state department issued a statement confirming that was its intention.

But it's now clear that a struggle is going on in the Reagan administration in which Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger and the Pentagon are still demanding the right to get on board.

A letter from Mr. Weinberger to Secretary of State George Shultz has come to light that says the U.S. government should not accede to multilateral decision-making on matters of space station management and operation. Mr. Weinberger says further that the U.S. should "explicitly reserve the right to conduct national security activities on the U.S. elements of the space station without the approval or review of other nations."

What national security activities? These have not been spelled out, but a study prepared for the U.S. Air Force by the aerospace industry sees the space station as a fuelling depot for military satellites and space battle stations, a repair and maintenance shop for Star Wars space weapons, and a factory to turn space junk into decoys and shields to protect space weapons.

Another proposal, from the U.S. Army, envisages the space station as a base for improving spy satellite

reconnaissance and the targeting of weapons.

External Affairs Minister Joe Clark told the Commons yesterday that Canada has made it very clear to the United States that it expects its original commitment to civilian research purposes to be honored, but doesn't propose to get into an internal U.S. dispute.

That's fair enough, but Mr. Clark should also make it clear that Canada doesn't propose to discuss its participation further until and unless the U.S. dispute is resolved in favor of a strictly peaceful role for the space station.

GLOBE AND MAIL Article

Toronto THE GLOBE AND MAIL in English 1 May 87 p A7

[Article by Lydia Dotto, freelance science writer living in Toronto and the author of "Canada in Space": "Space Station Fights for Peaceful Role"]

[Text]

NASA's beleaguered space-station program has had more close calls than the average Grade-B cliff-hanger, and the end of the political troubles is not yet in sight. Yet, the presence of negotiators from the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration in Ottawa this week suggests that one major barrier to international participation in the project — militarization of the station — has been overcome, at least for now.

Last week, NASA won a bitter power struggle with the U.S. Defence Department that allowed the negotiations with its partners to continue. Alarmed by the Pentagon's predatory moves on the station, Canada, Japan and the European participants had threatened to pull out unless the original status of the station, as a civilian program for peaceful purposes, were reaffirmed. This was done in a new draft of the agreement that reached Ottawa last week. Gone was a provision favored by the Pentagon claiming unrestricted rights to use the station for "national security purposes."

Still, there is hard bargaining ahead if Canada and the others are to ensure that they will have a real say in how the station is run and that it will remain a civilian facility even though some military-financed research of a "non-aggressive" nature may take place.

"We're encouraged by what's happened," said one Canadian official, "but there are still a lot of loose ends." For example, what kind of military research will qualify? Will it include work on President Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative? Canada is especially concerned about the \$800-million Mobile Servicing Centre (MSC) it is

contributing to the project. Will it wind up being used for Star Wars even though Ottawa has ruled out taking part in the plan?

Given the green light by Mr. Reagan in 1984, the space station is scheduled to be built in the mid-1990s, and will consist of a beam structure and pressurized modules for research labs and astronaut living quarters. The cost to the United States is estimated to be about \$12-billion (U.S.) in 1984 dollars, with Europe, Japan and Canada putting in nearly one-third again as much. Europe and Japan are building research modules; Canada's MSC will be used for the station's assembly, maintenance and repair facility.

The trouble with the military began late last year, when the U.S. Defence Department began to show an unwelcome interest in the station. At first, it had opposed the project, and then disdained it as useless for defence purposes. But the Challenger accident in January, 1986, changed the game plan. Expecting to have almost exclusive use of one of the four shuttles that were planned, the military had set up its own mission control and launch facility (both now mothballed), and recruited an astronaut corps.

Realizing that access to space would be a problem into the next decade, the Pentagon cast its eye on the space station and, last December, ordered NASA not to sign international agreements limiting station use, citing "national security purposes." Still stinging from the Challenger accident, NASA didn't have the political clout to fend off this assault.

Even so, the international partners were dismayed when NASA seemed helpless to

stop the Department of Defence from re-writing the rules. John Logsdon, a Washington space policy analyst, said that during negotiations, "it was clear that the DoD was the dominant player. When there were any questions, NASA had to go over in the corner and clear them..."

At issue were a few words in the agreement. NASA and its international partners wanted a provision that the station be a civilian program intended for peaceful purposes "in accordance with international law." Defence officials opposed any wording they felt would restrict their right to use the station for national security activities.

This was far more than an exercise in semantics. Dr. Logsdon characterized it as no less than a struggle for "the soul of the U.S. space program." The debate was really about "the end of civilian control over the future of the U.S. space program," he said.

Caught in the middle, NASA Administrator James Fletcher could only issue assurances when the international partners threatened to drop out unless Washington kept its word. Then came the bombshell.

Early in April, Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger sent a blunt letter to Secretary of State George Shultz, saying the United States was "in danger of paying too high a price for international co-operation." He said Washington must reserve the right to conduct national security activities on the U.S. owned part of the station "without the approval or review of other nations." NASA must not, he wrote, accede to multilateral decision-making on how the station is operated or allow the partnership to displace "either the reality or the symbol of U.S. leadership." The letter concluded, "We must be prepared to go forward alone if the price of co-operation is too high."

Nothing could have been more calculated to anger NASA's partners. "It was objectionable as hell," says an official in Canada's Department of External Affairs.

There was speculation that the letter was intended not only to alienate the partners, but to kill the space station. It certainly brought matters to a head — clearly, the White House would have to settle the squabble. Dr. Logsdon suggested that, by forcing President Reagan, who had made the station an international venture, to choose, the Defence Department had made "a tactical error." The letter also galvanized anti-military sentiment in Congress.

In a submission to the White House, Dr. Fletcher took the gloves off. He said the international partners feared the station was becoming a military facility and were "accusing the U.S. of bad faith." The President, he said, could be embarrassed by the partners' anger at being misled into wast-

ing \$200 million on space-station studies. The letter, quoted in the journal *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, charged that the Defence Department's position "creates the inaccurate impression, both at home and abroad, that we intend to behave as an outlaw nation and use the station for national security purposes that go beyond peaceful purposes and are thus not permitted under international law."

Although the National Security Council sided with NASA last week, Canada and the other international partners remain leery of just what will constitute non-aggressive military research. Some SDI proponents argue that the definition need not rule out Star Wars. Although the Outer Space Treaty bans the use of nuclear weapons or "weapons of mass destruction," they insist that SDI is a defensive system and lasers are not weapons of mass destruction. In fact, the U.S. Air Force says SDI research is "in the name of peace."

And then there's the Mobile Servicing Centre and whether it can be used for military purposes unacceptable to Canada. The space shuttle's Canadarm has served the military, but it now belongs to the United States. Ottawa plans to register the MSC under international law, which means technically that it will retain jurisdiction and control. On the other hand, the MSC will be an integral part of the station, and Canada is unlikely to have complete control of it.

Faced with these concerns, NASA's partners want to set up an international management board to give everyone a say in what happens and a chance to judge military projects case by case. This is where the hard bargaining comes in. Because the partners will contribute less than one-third of the station's cost, the United States is unlikely to want to give them an equal say, let alone a veto. How much power they do receive will be a test of what the proposed agreement calls "genuine partnership."

Canada, Europe and Japan have done an admirable job of helping a politically weak NASA fend off the Pentagon, but they should not relax their guard. Questions remain. Will the Pentagon play a strong role in station management? Will it be able to control who has access to the facilities and restrict the activities of non-U.S. participants for reasons of "national security?"

It's hard not to wonder when Caspar Weinberger's other shoe will drop.

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

CANADA: CLARK, OBERLE DISCUSS SPACE STATION ISSUES

Clark on Military Use

Toronto THE GLOBE AND MAIL in English 10 Apr 87 p A4

[Article by Richard Cleroux]

[Text]

OTTAWA

Canada intends to sidestep U.S. Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger in its bid to prevent a proposed U.S. space station from being used for military purposes, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark said yesterday.

Mr. Weinberger said recently in a letter to U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz he wants the United States to proceed alone on the space station so it can be used for military purposes. At present, minor partners in the project such as Canada, Japan and West Germany, want the space station to be used for peaceful purposes only.

Mr. Clark told the Commons yesterday that Canada expects the United States to stick to the original space station agreement which calls for peaceful uses only.

Outside the Commons, he said "the issue is not whether we can persuade Mr. Weinberger. The issue is whether we can persuade the (U.S.) Administration to take a judgment against the position that is being put forward by Mr. Weinberger . . ."

He said he is considering writing a letter to Mr. Shultz to reinforce what he told him Sunday night when the pair met in Ottawa.

"I made it clear to Mr. Shultz in private on two occasions," Mr. Clark said. "What we have to do is make sure the Americans understand our position."

He said Canada has committed about \$800-million over the next decade to the space station project.

New Democrat MP David Orlikow said he is not satisfied with Mr. Clark's answers. Canada should pull out of the space station project rather than wait until the Americans have turned it into a military project using Canadian money, he said.

Oberle on Possible European Project

Ottawa THE OTTAWA CITIZEN in English 10 Apr 87 p A4

[Text]

Science Minister Frank Oberle says European members of the U.S.-led space station project will build their own station if the joint venture falls through — and Canada is interested in joining any such European project.

"There is no doubt in my mind the Europeans would develop an orbiting space station if they pull out of the American project," he said in an interview on Thursday. "And we have something to contribute."

Canada, Japan and the European Space Agency, run by Western European governments, are negotiating terms for participation in the U.S. space station. The current round of Canada-U.S. talks dealing with management and cost-sharing is expected to conclude in early June, Oberle told the Commons science committee on Thursday.

Construction of the station is slated to begin in 1994. Canada has pledged \$800 million to build a crane and garage for the project, which could cost more than \$20 billion.

But U.S. officials have suggested the station be used for military purposes, including U.S. President Ronald Reagan's so-called Star Wars project, and that has raised doubts among the partners about continued participation.

U.S. Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger wrote U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz on Tuesday that the United States should be prepared to go it alone if the Americans cannot reserve the right in any agreement to use the station for their own national security activities.

While Canadian space officials negotiated with NASA officials Thursday in Washington on drafting an agreement, NASA administrator James Fletcher was telling a U.S. senate subcommittee the U.S. should not be swayed by complaints from its partners that the military will "take over" the \$20 billion U.S. manned space station.

Fletcher said the other countries have known all along that the military might use the space station and they should not be allowed to restrict its uses.

Asked about the Weinberger letter, Fletcher said: "We (NASA) have always indicated that the Defence Department would be allowed to use the space station... It is a national space station with international partners."

"I don't think it's part of our plan to submit for approval or review any activities on the space station," Fletcher said, adding that so far the Defence Department has not made any requests to use the space station.

Senator William Proxmire, (D-Wis.), referring to the Weinberger letter, said, "This is notice that they have every intent to do so."

Rep. David Nagle, (D-Iowa), who released the letter, said U.S. President Ronald Reagan should overrule the U.S. State Department and prohibit the military from using the space station.

"There's a great fear in Congress that the Pentagon will take over the space station," Nagle said. "The (Weinberger) letter underscores that fear."

Oberle said Thursday he has had "no indication" that the president, the State Department and NASA intend to use the station for

military purposes. He added that if Washington decides the station will become part of Star Wars, "we would certainly step away from it."

But Canada would quit in concert with the Europeans, he said, in the hope of joining any rival European space platform project.

An official with Spar Aerospace, the prime contractor for Canada's participation in the space station, said the company is not worried about Weinberger's statements.

Deidra Clayton, said the company has "inside information" that Weinberger's view is not shared by anyone else in the Reagan administration.

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CSO: 5220/43

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY 12 MAY PRESS CONFERENCE

NST Developments

PM141039 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 May 87 First Edition p 3

["In the Interest of Security. At the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center" -- KRASNAYA ZVEZDA headline]

[Text] At a briefing at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center on 12 May, the journalists' attention was focused on Poland's new foreign policy initiative. This is a comprehensive plan for arms reduction and confidence building in the central Europe zone, put forward by W. Jaruzelski, first secretary of the PZPR Central Committee and chairman of the Polish State Council. The USSR regards Poland's new proposal as an important contribution to the socialist countries' joint efforts aimed at strengthening peace and security in Europe, said G.I. Gerasimov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Administration.

The USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman went on to dwell on the draft treaty on strategic offensive arms which has been submitted by the U.S. delegation at the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva on nuclear and space arms. The draft, he said, is being attentively studied by the Soviet side. An assessment will be given later. At present we would like to confine ourselves to five preliminary remarks in connection with this document.

Here are the remarks on the U.S. draft, in which the Soviet side notes in a number of areas a direct departure from the accords reached in Reykjavik. First: The United States extends from 5 years to 7 years the term during which strategic offensive arms are to be reduced by half; Second: The draft incorporates provisions on the establishment of sublimits on strategic offensive arms, which are aimed at upsetting the Soviet strategic triad, which would be detrimental to the USSR's security; Third: Attention is drawn to the draft's failure to mention the limitation of long-range sea-based cruise missiles; Fourth: The question of the sides' further actions in strategic offensive arms reductions remains open; Fifth: It is of fundamental importance that the U.S. draft does not take into account the interrelationship that objectively exists between strategic offensive arms reductions and the prevention of an arms race in space and the strengthening of the ABM Treaty. Without solving the problem of preventing an arms race in space and preserving the ABM Treaty, it is impossible to embark on reducing strategic offensive arms.

In this connection it was noted at the briefing that the Soviet side has submitted at the Geneva talks a draft document "Key Provisions of Agreements." This fully accords with the Reykjavik accords and is aimed at achieving accords that are genuinely

acceptable to both sides on 50-percent reductions in strategic offensive arms with a clear guarantee that an agreement on strategic arms will not be undermined by the placing of weapons in space.

The Soviet position on plans to create an antimissile defense for West Europe linked with the U.S. SDI program was also explained to journalists. It was pointed out that should such plans be implemented they could open up yet another major sphere of the arms race in the European Continent and undermine efforts to strengthen security and stability in Europe.

Touching upon FRG Chancellor H. Kohl's statement on disarmament problems, the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman noted that while expressing himself in favor of a speedy conclusion of an agreement on medium-range missiles in principle, the chancellor in effect evaded responding to the Soviet proposal for the elimination of operational and tactical missiles in the continent.

And yet quite recently these missiles were still described in Bonn as the main threat to Europe in the event of the elimination here of medium-range systems.

The FRG's overall approach to disarmament problems is also evoking surprise. Declaring that there is a "need for new thinking and new action" in the sphere of arms control, the chancellor nonetheless again extolled the "nuclear deterrent" to which, according to him, there is no alternative in the near future.

Rarotonga Treaty Discussed

LD121612 Moscow TASS in English 1520 GMT 12 May 87

[Text] Moscow May 12 TASS -- "Three out of five nuclear powers -- the United States, Britain, and France -- did not sign protocols 2 and 3 to the Rarotonga Treaty on declaring the South Pacific a nuclear-free zone and, judging by their statements, do not intend to do that in future either," a spokesman for the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated at a briefing here today.

"Moreover," he said, "those countries are conducting a coordinated campaign in an attempt to sow distrust of the Soviet Union's goals in the region. They chose as a target the interpreting statement which the Soviet Union made when signing appropriate protocols."

In this connection the spokesman for the Soviet Foreign Ministry emphasized that when ratifying the protocols to the Rarotonga Treaty the Soviet Union would proceed from such an interpretation of its provisions which would promote the consolidation of the nuclear-free zone status of the South Pacific.

"So, the Soviet Union is ready to fully fulfill the obligations which it has taken upon itself by signing the protocols."

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR: DISARMAMENT, NOT DETERRENCE SAID KEY TO SECURITY

PM081555 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 6 May 87 First Edition p 1

["Our Dialogue" article by Vladlen Kuznetsov: "Nuclear Disarmament or Deterrence"]

[Text] M.S. Gorbachev's visit to Czechoslovakia, his talks with the leaders of the fraternal socialist countries and other states, the political dialogues with M. Thatcher and G. Shultz, and the new peace initiatives put forward by the Soviet Union provide much food for thought about prospects for disarmament and about the destinies of war and peace.

Is a nuclear-free world possible or is it the naive dream of humanity? Can the international community build relations without relying on nuclear weapons? Is nuclear disarmament a realistic prospect or is it merely utopia?

These issues are currently being debated by representatives of the public and state figures. It is a quest for truth, a clarification of positions. They bear a direct relation to whether common philosophical ground can be found between East and West for the building of a better, less heavily armed world that could one day become totally demilitarized. Without establishing what is what and who is who, without seeking common approaches or at least points of contact, there will be no mutual understanding and trust. There will be no agreements in the sphere of limiting and reducing the arms race.

When she was in Moscow, British Prime Minister M. Thatcher expressed views that are rather prevalent in Western political and military circles, above all in NATO. What are they?

The existence of nuclear weapons is a fact and people cannot be made to forget the secret of their production...

Nuclear weapons have prevented the occurrence not only of a nuclear war, but of a conventional war in Europe...

It is unrealistic to expect a nuclear-free Europe in the foreseeable future...

A world without nuclear weapons would be less stable and more dangerous for us all...

Nuclear weapons are presented as a benefit to peace, as a patent method of preserving it, as the elixir of security. As a reality that cannot be changed, as something immovable that mankind has to learn to live with and will never be able to get rid of.

As we can see, the "moment of truth" on matters of security and nuclear disarmament has not yet come for Western officialdom. The summit of the new political thinking is for the moment unattainable, unconquered. The test of state wisdom is yet to come. Intellectual shackles, the shackles of militarized thinking, are nearly always stronger than irons.

Even postulates need to be proven. But the arguments of the apologists of nuclear weapons do not exactly overwhelm one with their soundness or their persuasiveness. Obviously, they sense this and endeavor to reinforce their position by citing authorities. In Moscow M. Thatcher turned to W. Churchill for assistance, to his advice: "Most of all beware of abandoning nuclear weapons until you are sure, and more than sure, that you possess other means of maintaining peace." An authority? Okay. But here is the curious thing: In the West they love quoting Churchill and cite him as a witness whenever the Western military-political elite's favorite dogma, peace from a position of strength, needs shoring up.

But was Churchill as one-dimensional a politician as they like to make out? No, not to the extent that he did not see the dangers associated with the existence of nuclear weapons and nuclear confrontation between the two worlds. But evidently for some of his followers he is of no value in that capacity. Otherwise -- for objectivity's sake -- one might cite the following from the legacy of one of the pillars of British politics: "We must not forget that we will make ourselves a target, perhaps the very center of the target, if we create a U.S. nuclear base in Britain." They prefer not to remember that Churchill. But in vain!

According to the advocates of nuclear weapons, in the nuclear era interstate relations can be based only on the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. But doesn't this doctrine turn states into targets? Such a role, such a fate can scarcely be deemed worthy, highly moral, and productive, in keeping with the vital needs of our scientific-technical age. The Soviet Union would prefer them to be magnets promoting contacts, good-neighborliness, and cooperation, to be partners rather than targets. The doctrine of nuclear deterrence, which they idolize, inevitably turns states into targets of another doctrine -- mutual assured destruction. President R. Reagan calls this doctrine immoral and attempts to demonstrate the defensive nature of his "Star Wars" program. One can go along with the White House head's view without agreeing that SDI is capable of guaranteeing a peaceful future for mankind.

From the viewpoint of human morality, from the viewpoint of actually safeguarding a peaceful future for our world, it is necessary to abandon both nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence. The Soviet Union cannot accept that nuclear deterrence is the only possible way of preventing war. To rely on nuclear deterrence is to rely on blind chance, to accept the risk of a catastrophe that could occur, and not necessarily as a result of evil intent, but as a result of a technical error or human negligence. And the possibility of such errors and instances of negligence is bound to increase as military technology builds up and becomes more complex and as more of it invades space.

Yes, nuclear deterrence is, unfortunately, a reality. But it is a reality that must be changed, or, rather, replaced with another reality -- nuclear disarmament. Why should this be done? Because nuclear deterrence suffers from intrinsic flaws that threaten to destroy civilization.

Nuclear deterrence means an unbridled arms race and the pursuit of military superiority. It is a constant challenge to strategic stability.

Nuclear deterrence is an evasion of real disarmament and sabotages it.

Nuclear deterrence perpetuates international tension, brings futile confrontation, and preserves distrust, which poisons relations between peoples and states.

Nuclear deterrence fosters the image of the "potential enemy," the "deadly foe," and the ideology and mentality of antagonism and enmity.

Nuclear deterrence means subjecting politics to the rule of militarism and the further militarization of thinking.

Nuclear deterrence means urging others to possess the most destructive weapons, to acquire nuclear power status and the ability to "deter" others.

Nuclear deterrence means unsound, illusory security, a fragile, unreliable peace living in constant expectation of a nuclear storm, and fear for the present and the future.

Nuclear deterrence means unpredictability, uncertainty, and, essentially, brinkmanship, recalling Dulles' term.

Can there be security without nuclear weapons? The Soviet Union believes that the world will acquire genuine security when it becomes nuclear-free. NATO countries' leading circles have different ideas: Security is identified with the preservation and buildup of nuclear weapons. Well, consequently, it is necessary to continue and deepen the East-West political dialogue, achieve better understanding of one another's positions, and together pave the way to new political thinking. It is the comparison, the clash of views that will ultimately reveal the common denominator that will enable the East and the West to create a less heavily armed and safer world.

A nuclear-free world is ceasing to be an unattainable dream before our very eyes. The starting point has been established and the preconditions exist for progress toward such a world.

First, the international community now possesses the basic outline of an all-embracing concept of effectively verifiable disarmament covering all types of weapons and all spheres -- land and sea, air and space. There is, therefore, a draft, a blueprint of a nuclear-free world.

Second, this concept is not only the object of discussion by all mankind, but of interstate talks as well. Reykjavik confirmed the viability and practicability of the idea of nuclear disarmament.

Third, nuclear disarmament is no longer merely a matter for the USSR and the United States. It is a matter of the self-preservation of all of mankind. The results and experience of Reykjavik, which was concerned with the

possibility of the most far-reaching accords on curbing the arms race since the war, have become the common property of all countries and peoples.

All this put together provides a good site for building a new, nuclear-free home for all of mankind -- a home in which it might feel completely safe. But this home cannot be built out of abstract arguments about the desirability of disarmament. It is necessary first of all to clear the construction site of the obstacles of inveterate confrontation, of the detritus of the policy of nuclear deterrence and blackmail, the "deadly foe" mentality and other similar attributes of prenuclear political thinking. East and West must join forces in erecting on the cleared site the edifice of international security based on abandonment of nuclear weapons.

Addressing a Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship rally in Prague, M.S. Gorbachev said: "The Soviet Union has responsibly declared its wish to seek mutually acceptable solutions for the whole range of nuclear disarmament issues." This is the aim of all the USSR's concrete peace initiatives, which have made such a broad impact in the world.

The political struggle for nuclear disarmament is a difficult one. The Soviet Union has no illusions on that score. But the struggle is necessary. Necessary for civilization's self-preservation.

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CSO: 5200/1475

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

FOREIGN SECRETARY HOWE COMMENTS ON GORBACHEV ARMS OFFER

London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 1700 GMT 7 May 87

[Article by Michael Prescott]

[Text]

Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe today praised Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev for the "new thinking" that had increased the likelihood of an arms deal. But he said there still remained three "litmus tests" of the Soviets' wish for change. They were: pulling out of Afghanistan, allowing verification of any arms control, and improving human rights. Sir Geoffrey reaffirmed that nuclear weapons would remain vital for Western defence even if some types of missiles were scrapped. He said this was because reductions in nuclear weapons would highlight the Soviet Union's superiority in other areas.

In his speech to the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, Sir Geoffrey said Mr Gorbachev and his colleagues realised the Soviet Union was "a poor advertisement" for socialism. The Gorbachev leadership had rejected doctrines on the triumph of world socialism as "bookish theories" although he realised Mr Gorbachev might prove to be "the latest in a line of Russian leaders who have aimed at bold reform but come up against the intractable limits of the Leninist system."

Sir Geoffrey praised the Soviet leader for the "vigour and imagination" with which he aimed to "cut away the inefficiency, sloth and corruption that has clogged it (the Soviet system) up for years." This was a "colossal" task, but Sir Geoffrey said he and the prime minister made it quite plain when in Moscow that they welcomed the reforms.

He said later: "Thanks to this belated shift in Soviet thinking, we are getting, for the first time, reasonably close, not to freezing nuclear armaments at existing levels, but to cutting them sharply or even eliminating certain categories altogether."

"This would be a great step forward. Nuclear weapons will remain essential for our defence for the foreseeable future but both superpowers could manage better with fewer nuclear weapons than at present."

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CSO: 5240/083

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

BRIEFS

SOVIET PRESS CONFERENCE IN VIENNA--Vienna May 7 TASS--A press conference for Austrian and foreign correspondents was held here today at the Soviet Embassy. It was addressed by the Soviet special representative ambassador at large Vladimir Suslov and the Soviet ambassador in Austria Gennadiy Shikin. They outlined the Soviet position on questions of nuclear disarmament in Europe, acquainted the journalists with the situation at the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space arms and replied to numerous questions. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1658 GMT 7 May 87 LD] /6091

CSO: 5200/1475

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: KARPOV INTERVIEWED ON SHULTZ TALKS, DRAFT TREATY

WA061830 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 17, 4 May 87 pp 6-8

[Interview with Viktor Karpov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry's Department for Arms Limitation and Disarmament, by reporter Nikita Zholkver: "Formula for Success -- Europe Without Missiles"; date not given]

[Text] [Zholkver] The final press conference of the U.S. Secretary of State caused many to take a hopeful view. Although controversial issues clearly remain, changes for the better would appear to outweigh them. Or are you of a different opinion?

[Karpov] I would not say that. I think that in any case it may be said that there is hope. Hope for the conclusion of an agreement with the U.S. on a question of great importance not only for our bilateral relations, but also for universal security, for removing the threat of nuclear war.

Our approach is this: whatever the complications in our relations, whatever the problems, often artificially created by the American side -- like the recent charges of spying on the U.S. embassy -- this should not overshadow the main thing -- the need to search for solutions in matters connected with nuclear arms in space, ending nuclear tests, and reducing the armed forces and armaments in Europe.

Here some headway has been made. But I should like to draw your attention to the fact that the credit for this goes primarily to the Soviet Union, although the Secretary of State wished to create the impression that it was thanks to his visit to Moscow. What was achieved during the talks George Shultz had with Mikhail Gorbachev, Nikolay Ryzhkov and Eduard Shevardnadze reflects the efforts made by the Soviet side to place the negotiations on a practical footing. And above all, in a sphere which, as Reykjavik showed, is the most promising, namely, that of medium-range missiles in Europe.

We still stand by the Reykjavik formula. The U.S. also agrees that this formula should be the basis of a future agreement. However, of late the U.S. has been laying emphasis on the question of shorter-range missiles -- from 500 to 1,000 kilometres -- being settled simultaneously with that of medium-range missiles. We have taken a major step towards meeting that position: if the question of operational-tactical missiles could in any way impede agreement on medium-range missiles, we are ready to remove that obstacle by doing away with our operational-tactical missiles in Europe, unilaterally and in a comparatively brief and clearly specified time. It would be a good thing if the U.S. Secretary of State gave an equally clear-cut explanation of our position to the NATO allies of the United States whom he went to meet straight from Moscow.

[Zholkver] Judging by the initial reports from Brussels, George Shultz gave the NATO Council a somewhat vague account of his talks in Moscow. And Washington's West European partners too displayed no particular enthusiasm. What else is there to prevent an early achievement of agreement on medium-range missiles in linkage with operational-tactical missiles?

[Karpov] It seems to me that objectively there are no obstacles to agreement. Unless, of course, they are artificially created. The basic thesis of the Americans before Shultz went to Moscow was this: the Russians, it was contended, have the advantage in operational-tactical missiles. And until that advantage is eliminated by a buildup of these missiles by the United States, there can be no agreement on medium-range missiles. Because supposedly the Soviet Union would gain by it. Now that dubious argument has lost all meaning.

[Zholkver] The other day Volker Ruhe, CDU/CSU [Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union] deputy floor leader in the West German Bundestag, known to NEW TIMES readers for his contributions to our magazine, wrote in the newspaper HAMBURGER ANZEIGER that "the Soviet Union has a tenfold superiority over the West as regards missiles with a range from 150 to 1,000 kilometres."

[Karpov] The question of missiles with a range of less than 500 km has little to do with what was actually discussed in the talks between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. Why was this done? It is one of two things -- either it is just another trial balloon to see whether the talks could be hampered by raising this angle, or else the author of the article simply did not know what he was writing about.

The problem of tactical missiles with a range of up to 500 kilometres also figures in the Soviet proposals. Mikhail Gorbachev said quite plainly that the U.S.S.R. is prepared to do away with them. The collective proposals advanced by the Warsaw Treaty countries on this score were formulated as far back as June last year in the Budapest appeal thus: tactical nuclear weapons would be reduced in step with the disbandment of the army formations equipped with such missiles. As Mikhail Gorbachev said, we now are prepared to go still further -- towards the complete liquidation of weapons of this class. And so Ruhe's sally clearly misses the mark.

[Zholkver] It seems to me that what adds to the confusion of people not particularly well versed in military technology is the diversity of designations given to the various categories of missiles -- medium-range, shorter-range, intermediate-range, operational-tactical and regional. Could you perhaps clarify the classifications -- both Soviet and American?

[Karpov] It is a matter of difference of approach. In our terminology there are intercontinental strategic missiles with a range of 5,500 kilometres and more, medium-range missiles from 1,000 up to 5,500 kilometres, operational-tactical -- from 500 to 1,000 kilometres, and tactical missiles with a range of less than 500 kilometres.

In NATO terminology there are intercontinental ballistic missiles -- this definition coincides with our own, but then come the longer-range intermediate missiles (1,800-5,500 km), and shorter-range intermediate missiles (1,800-500 km). Missiles with a range of less than 500 kilometres are called tactical missiles -- here, too, the definitions coincide.

[Zholkver] Could the differences in classification not be an obstacle to agreement?

[Karpov] Why should they be? After all, there is the perfectly concrete criterion of range. I will say this -- given the desire to reach agreement, terminological discrepancies should not be an obstacle.

[Zholkver] Judging by statements made by U.S. leaders, the United States would be interested in the complete liquidation of medium-range missiles. Why does the Soviet Union insist on both sides retaining 100 warheads each?

[Karpov] Because we cannot but take into account the fact that the United States has nuclear weapons in the Asian-Pacific region. It has there hundreds, I repeat, hundreds of delivery means for nuclear weapons -- missiles and aircraft. Moreover, some of them are located in direct proximity to the territory of the Soviet Union. For instance, a base for F-16 aircraft -- those up-to-date means of delivery of nuclear weapons -- has been set up and is being expanded at Misawa, on Honshu Island.

In South Korea the U.S. has begun deploying tactical nuclear weapons -- so far, the Lance missile with a range of 130 kilometres. But there is no guarantee that they will not be replaced by longer-range missiles. Clearly, we must have a potential that would serve as a counterweight. If the United States is ready to talk about a mutual reduction and the elimination of these potentials we shall not object.

[Zholkver] It looks as if we are giving the United States a "present" by allowing it to have 100 warheads on its territory. After all, the hundred in the Asian part of the U.S.S.R., as you say, are not a counterweight to them.

[Karpov] Let me explain. We say -- and this must be an indispensable condition of an agreement -- that the warheads on the medium-range missiles the U.S. will retain on its territory must not be able to reach the territory of the Soviet Union. We categorically insist on this condition being observed. And for this reason. At the present time there are no medium-range missiles in the U.S. capable of reaching Soviet territory. Just as we have no medium-range missiles capable of reaching U.S. territory.

If, after we reduce our medium-range missiles in the Asian part of our country, the United States should simultaneously deploy 100 warheads capable of reaching our territory, the agreement aimed at scaling down the nuclear confrontation between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. would, on the contrary, heighten that confrontation. We hold that this would not accord with the Soviet Union's security interests.

[Zholkver] To return to Europe, and in particular to the position of Britain and France. The public pronouncements of official spokesmen of these two nuclear powers reveal a clearly negative attitude to the prospect of a nuclear-free Europe, an unwillingness to include the British and French nuclear forces in the negotiating process. But, after all, one cannot close one's eyes indefinitely not only to the existence of these potentials but to the fact that they are being built up.

[Karpov] True. When we took the step that opens the way to the elimination of Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe we were taking a certain risk. But this does not mean that our proposals overlook the existence of the French and British nuclear potentials. Certainly not. We believe that the elimination of the Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe should be the first step towards the elimination of all nuclear weapons in that continent. And of course both Britain and France should join in this process. In the programme for nuclear disarmament put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev on January 15, 1986, this is envisaged as the second stage -- after the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. have carried out a 50 per cent reduction of their nuclear arsenals.

[Zholkver] In the course of the talks George Shultz had in Moscow the problem of SBI was touched upon. In this connection there is talk about some change in the Soviet position with regard to the "Star Wars" programme. What is new in Moscow's approach to this question?

[Karpov] Essentially, it is a further development of the position of which we spoke earlier. In Reykjavik, for instance. The substance remains unchanged: the Soviet Union favours strict and complete observance of the ABM Treaty. U.S. officials have come out with a new interpretation of the treaty (the so-called "broad" interpretation), for which, incidentally, there is no justification whatever, either in the text of the treaty itself or in the agreed statements appended to it, or in the history of the negotiations themselves.

Since October 1985, when the U.S. first began to speak of the "broad" interpretation, a certain difference of opinion as regards the understanding of the treaty has emerged. We say to the United States: let us remove all differences as regards the limits that must not be overstepped in research, development and testing of the means of anti-missile defence. To this end let our experts determine what, in order not to violate the ABM Treaty, must not be placed in outer space for testing or deployment purposes.

The Americans either evade the issue or categorically object to any such suggestion. This is understandable. It does not suit their purpose, for any discussion of the limits of the permissible raises doubts as to the validity of their "broad" interpretation of the treaty. We understand this. But if there is to be an identical, mutually-shared and indeed the only acceptable interpretation of the treaty, the procedure we propose for agreeing the positions of the two sides is indispensable.

The Americans complained that we did not make it clear what we meant by restricting things to "laboratory limits." We have explained now that what is meant is not only research institutes with doors bearing the sign "Laboratory," but also proving grounds and factory testing facilities where such tests are carried out. And what, above all, must be excluded is violation of Article 5 of the treaty, which bans the development, testing and deployment of space-based ABM systems or components. For this it is very important to determine what devices must not be placed in outer space for testing or deployment purposes.

[Zholkver] What tests are not prohibited by the treaty? What will be tried out on these proving grounds?

[Karpov] ABM components may be tested, provided they are intended for replacements permitted by the treaty. We are allowed to have 100 anti-missile missiles, 100 launchers and a certain number of radar stations around Moscow. Testing of a device, even if it is not an exact copy of what we already have, but let us say a laser device intended to replace a launcher or an anti-missile missile, is permitted. But only in a stationary, on-the-ground version. This the treaty does not forbid.

[Zholkver] Does this not make it possible to test components of a future ABM space system without putting them into orbit?

[Karpov] Theoretically, an anti-missile missile can be deployed in outer space. For this it is necessary to orbit a satellite platform and mount anti-missile missiles on it. This can be done even without space tests. Lasers can also be tested in an artificial vacuum on the ground or in the atmosphere with a certain adjustment. There are no restrictions on this kind of testing.

The trouble is, however, that it is necessary to make the laser part of the space-based ABM system, to develop the technology of putting it in orbit, and ensure it the necessary power supply. But all this is not simple. In order to have a guarantee that the laser system for combating ballistic missiles will function in outer space, it has to be tested in space.

[Zholkver] The next round of the Soviet-American negotiations begins in Geneva on April 23. Of course, there is no point in anticipating events and making optimistic predictions. But what does Moscow expect of the coming round?

[Karpov] The working group dealing with medium-range missiles resumes discussions on April 23. It will continue to work on the drafting of a joint text of a treaty on the elimination of the Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe and corresponding limitations in the Asian part of the U.S.S.R. and in the territory of the United States. We are working on a compromise draft taking into account the U.S. position and offering solutions on questions which have given rise to disagreement and different interpretations. We hope that this draft will open the way to completing the work on the treaty.

[Zholkver] Could there be a new summit meeting this year?

[Karpov] As a matter of fact, we are proposing such a meeting. But it must be productive. Specifically, we propose that a draft of a treaty on medium range missiles be prepared for the summit, at which it would be signed, and that at the same time a document be drawn up that would contain if not the full texts of agreements on space and on offensive strategic arms, then at least the groundwork for such agreements.

We have already handed the Americans a draft of the key provisions of these agreements. It provides for fully guaranteed observance of the ABM Treaty for a period of ten years, without giving the sides the right to invoke Article 15 under which withdrawal from the treaty is allowed in extraordinary circumstances. The draft also contains the formula of a 50 per cent reduction in strategic arms which is based fully on the Reykjavik formula. And, lastly, the draft includes the proposal to begin full-scale talks on ending nuclear tests. If our proposals are approved by the American side they could determine the content and outcome of a meeting at summit level. In that case the road to Washington will be open.

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CSO: 5200/1481

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

ITALIAN PAPER INTERVIEWS USSR'S PETROVSKIY ON 'NEW THINKING'

PM120812 Rome L'ESPRESSO in Italian 3 May 87 p 66

[Interview with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy by Massimo Loche in Moscow; date not given]

[Excerpt] [Loche] Is there "a new thinking" in foreign policy too?

[Petrovskiy] Certainly. It is based on three points: The first is that the means of guaranteeing peace in the nuclear era is political negotiation, with the exclusion of the traditional military method; the second is that, together with diplomatic initiatives, there must also be cultural and economic initiatives; and the third is that such initiatives must be coordinated.

[Loche] What specifically does all this mean?

[Petrovskiy] Our proposal to ban all nuclear, chemical, and other weapons by a definite deadline -- the end of the 20th century.

[Loche] Why, having said that the package presented in Reykjavik is indivisible, did you separate the part dealing with Euromissiles?

[Petrovskiy] It is a sign of the new thinking, precisely. We do not claim to have a monopoly on the truth and are prepared to seek solutions together with all those who sincerely want peace.

[Loche] What is your opinion of the responses to your proposals?

[Petrovskiy] Previously they would say to us: "Everything cannot be included in a single package." Then the same people begin linking the Euromissiles issue to that of short-range missiles and conventional weapons. This suggests that some people are using any kind of excuse to reject any agreement whatever.

[Loche] Nevertheless the dialogue continues....

[Petrovskiy] We are opposed to the theory of art for art's sake. At least it is possible to hold a discussion about aesthetics, but in politics dialogue for dialogue's sake is dangerous: There must be tangible results.

[Loche] Would you say that it was a mistake to fill Europe with your SS-20s?

[Petrovskiy] I believe all decisions must be assessed in the light of the historical situation in which they were made.

[Loche] So this means continuity. But is it true that you absolutely must have peace in order to carry out your restructuring?

[Petrovskiy] We do not conceal the fact that disarmament would permit the release of resources for the peaceful development of the economy, but even without disarmament we will be able to carry out our plans, albeit at a very high price.

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CSO: 5200/1481

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR'S OBUKHOV INTERVIEWED ON 'ZERO OPTION' PROPOSAL

AU141329 Bratislava SMENA in Slovak 13 May 87 p 2

[Interview with Aleksey Obukhov, deputy head of the Soviet delegation at the talks on nuclear and space weapons in Geneva; report by NOVOSTI political commentator Spartak Beglov: "What Is New in Geneva?" -- date and place of interview not given]

[Text] "All prerequisites exist for the Soviet-U.S. treaty on eliminating medium-range missiles to become reality before the end of this year," Ambassador Aleksey Obukhov, deputy head of the USSR delegation at the talks on nuclear and space weapons, said in an interview. "If you consider that the Soviet Union has also proposed the elimination of operational and tactical missiles stationed in Europe, you must definitely agree with those who speak of a 'double zero option.' This reflects the radical character of our initiatives, which are fully founded on the understanding reached at the Soviet-U.S. summit in Reykjavik."

The day of our interview coincided with a major event -- with the opening of another round of Soviet-U.S. talks on strategic offensive weapons. On 5 May the Soviet delegation proposed to the U.S. delegation to start working out the "key provisions" relating to the 50-percent cut in the two sides' strategic offensive forces in conjunction with the solution of questions of reinforcing the regime of the ABM Treaty and with Soviet-U.S. talks on banning all nuclear tests.

One more event connected with the Soviet-U.S. dialogue deserves attention. On 4 May, at talks held concurrently in Geneva, preparation work was wound up regarding a joint draft agreement between the USSR and the United States on setting up nuclear risk reduction centers and regarding two protocols on this draft agreement. The texts of these documents will be submitted to the governments of the two countries for confirmation. But let us return to the talks on medium-range missiles in Europe. The exceptional interest these talks have aroused everywhere is understandable.

"A situation has arisen," Ambassador Aleksey Obukhov stressed, "in which -- thanks to the Soviet proposals -- the chance to achieve a breakthrough by signing, for the first time in history, an agreement on an actual reduction of nuclear arms has appeared on the horizon." He went on to point out that the Soviet side has taken into account all aspects it deems constructive in the U.S. document submitted earlier. This concerns, for example, the principle of gradual arms reduction, the same definition of the reduction of devices, keeping record of both deployed [rozvinuty] and undeveloped devices, and adherence to the Reykjavik formula on eliminating all medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe within 5 years with each side keeping 100 warheads -- the USSR in its Asian part and the United States on its territory.

The Soviet side disagrees with some propositions that still remain in the U.S. concept. For example, it regards as unacceptable the proposal that in the first long-term stage only the Soviet Union would be eliminating its missiles, while the U.S. side would even be allowed to increase the number of its medium-range missiles.

"Our principle is clear! No one-sided advantages for anyone. Both sides must be obligated to become involved in the nuclear arms reduction process. The United States' attempt to rebuild the Pershing-2 missiles to shorten their range, and their plans to acquire the chance to switch cruise missiles from land bases to the sea and to deploy the remaining 100 warheads on medium-range missiles in Alaska, that is, within range of USSR territory, are all unacceptable. That would result in the creation of a dangerous new hotbed in that part of the world," Ambassador Aleksey Obukhov said.

In our talk we were naturally unable to get around the issue of the European countries' response to the Soviet proposals. The profound satisfaction of the broad public of self-explanatory. Viewed against this background, the attitude of the leadership of some NATO member states is at odds with logic.

I drew Aleksey Obukhov's attention to the following objection being raised in Bonn: Some government officials regard the elimination of [medium-range] nuclear missiles and of the operational and tactical missiles -- and, hence, the fact that the United States is deprived of the opportunity to deploy these weapons in Europe -- as undermining the strategy of "flexible response." They claim that this would turn the FRG into the theater of a nuclear war using tactical nuclear weapons.

"These are all contrived excuses," the Soviet diplomat said, "the aim of which is to impede the process of negotiations. Our ultimate ideal is the reduction of all nuclear arms in Europe to zero. The initiative of the Warsaw Pact member countries aimed at reducing all weapons and armed forces, including their tactical nuclear arms, clearly bears out our sincerity and consistency in this process. Aside from this, the Soviet Union supports the proposal of the CSSR and the GDR to create a nuclear-free corridor along the borderline between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. We are resolved to undertake the guarantee for such an agreement and to remove our nuclear arms from this corridor."

Bonn and Paris claim that they cannot take a final stand on the Soviet proposals without being provided with detailed information about them.

"Also, these claims are contrived," the ambassador explained. "American representatives regularly visit the NATO staff in Brussels as well as the other capitals of Western Europe and, as we know, they inform their allies about what is going on in Geneva. We, too, broadly inform the international public about our proposals. They are discussed in detail in statements by the Soviet leadership. This is an integral part of implementing the principle of openness in our policy.

"The Soviet side came to the talks not to engage in idle debates but to work constructively and efficiently in order to find solutions and work out mutually acceptable positions in the interest of the speedy achievement of an agreement. To claim that an agreement on medium-range missiles suits only the interests of the Soviet Union is just as silly and unnatural as to say that only Russians cannot do without ozone," the ambassador said in concluding the interview.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: GERASIMOV FOREIGN MINISTRY NEWS CONFERENCE 12 MAY

U.S. Draft Arms Treaty

LD121608 Moscow TASS in English 1503 GMT 12 May 87

[Text] Moscow May 12 TASS -- "The Soviet side is attentively studying the draft treaty on strategic offensive arms which the U.S. delegation has submitted at the talks in Geneva," Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the Information Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said at a briefing for journalists here today.

"The U.S. draft treaty", he said, "really reflects the Reykjavik accords on reducing strategic offensive arms by half, as was stated by United States President Ronald Reagan. The draft treaty also records quantitative parameters for limiting the types of weapons which were spoken of in Reykjavik, i.e., for cutting all strategic weapon delivery vehicles down to 1,600 units."

"However," the spokesman for the Soviet Foreign Ministry pointed out, "not everything which was agreed upon in Reykjavik about strategic offensive arms has found embodiment in the draft treaty submitted by the U.S. delegation."

"Moreover, on a number of aspects the Soviet side sees a departure from the Reykjavik understandings. Therefore one cannot agree with President Reagan that the Soviet side's misgivings have been taken into account in this draft treaty."

In this connection Gennadiy Gerasimov pointed out that, although an evaluation of the draft treaty would be made later, five preliminary remarks could be made on that score already now.

"First: A period during which strategic offensive arms should be cut down by half is extended by the U.S. side from five years, as was specified in Reykjavik, to seven years".

"Second: The fact that the draft treaty includes provisions on establishing sublimits on strategic offensive arms contradicts what was spoken of in Reykjavik. The sublimits are aimed at upsetting the Soviet strategic triad and its structure. This is detrimental to the security of the Soviet Union".

"Third: The draft treaty does not mention a reduction in long-range sea-launched cruise missiles".

"Fourth: The question of further actions of the sides in reducing strategic offensive arms remains open".

"Fifth: The U.S. draft treaty does not take into account the objectively existing interconnection between a reduction in strategic offensive arms and the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the consolidation of the regime of the ABM Treaty."

"The Soviet side holds that without solving the problem of preventing an arms race in outer space it is impossible to set about reducing offensive arms. Of importance is also the provision that if under accords on cuts in strategic offensive arms any of the sides would decide to begin practical development of a space-based anti-missile defence system, the other side would have a right to consider itself free from observing obligations on reducing strategic offensive arms."

"At the talks in Geneva," the spokesman for the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs said, "there is the Soviet draft document entitled 'The Key Provisions of an Agreement'. The draft document fully corresponds to the Reykjavik understandings and is aimed at achieving accords acceptable to both sides on 50 percent cuts in strategic offensive arms with the guarantee that the agreement will not be undermined by the orbiting of weapons."

FRG Disarmament Stand

LD121643 Moscow TASS in English 1616 GMT 12 May 87

[Text] Moscow May 12 TASS -- A spokesman for the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, commenting on the speech delivered in the Bundestag by the chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), the speech in which he made a government statement on disarmament issues, pointed out that the FRG's overall approach to these issues had given rise to surprise in the Soviet Union.

"On the one hand," the spokesman said, "the chancellor spoke of the need for a new thinking and new actions in the field of arms control. On the other, he praised 'nuclear deterrence' to which, in his view, there is no alternative in the near future."

"The government of the FRG has repeatedly stated its intention to act as a reliable, predictable and trustworthy partner. Therefore the Soviet Union expected that the FRG would declare in favour of specific steps aimed at lowering the level of military confrontation in Europe. The more so as the Soviet initiatives had been worked out with due regard for the opinion of West European countries, including the FRG."

"However, having declared on the whole for concluding an agreement on medium range missiles as soon as possible, the chancellor practically evaded a reply to the Soviet proposal on eliminating shorter-range missiles on the continent as well. Only recently these missiles were declared by Bonn to be the main threat to Europe in the event of elimination of medium-range missiles."

"Judging by pronouncements by officials and the press of a number of NATO countries," the spokesman for the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs pointed out, "those countries think of plans to develop an anti-missile defence system for Western Europe in conjunction with the U.S. SDI programme."

"If those designs are implemented, yet another major direction would open up in the arms race. Efforts to strengthen security, particularly European one, would be

undermined. Such kind of development efforts being made together with the U.S. SDI programme obviously circumvent the 1972 Soviet-U.S. ABM Treaty."

'Jaruzelski Plan'

LD121720 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1555 GMT 12 May 87

[Text] Moscow, 12 May (TASS) -- The Soviet Union sees the new proposals of the PPR, which received the name "Jaruzelski Plan" as an important contribution to the joint efforts of socialist countries aimed at consolidating peace and security in Europe, stated Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the Information Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He spoke here today at the briefing for newsmen.

This is a plan for reducing armaments and strengthening confidence in the central European zone on the territory of nine European states, although this number can be increased. According to the opinion of the Polish side, noted Gennadiy Gerasimov, this is both a plan and a program, the essence of which is the gradual withdrawal of jointly agreed types of operational and tactical nuclear weapons and conventional armaments, primarily those with the greatest strike capacity and accuracy, which could be used for a surprise attack. The plan envisages thorough verification and monitoring measures [mery proverki i kontrolya]. Along with this, the "Jaruzelski Plan" proposes to make the military doctrines of the two opposing blocs purely defensive.

The implementation of the new Polish initiative would, in our view, the representative of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs stressed, assist in reducing the level of military confrontation on the European Continent, strengthening trust among the European countries, and advancing on the road to disarmament.

This proposal is also very important in the context of the development of pan-European process.

Thai Foreign Minister Visits

LD121520 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1347 GMT 12 May 87

[Excerpt] Moscow, 12 May (TASS)--Foreign Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand, Chief Marshal of the Air Force Sitthi Sawetsila, who is currently on an official visit in Moscow, declared on behalf of the ASEAN member countries for the development of relations between the association's member countries and the Soviet Union, said Gennadiy Gerasimov, chief of the Information Directorate of the USSR Foreign Ministry, addressing today a briefing for Soviet and foreign newsmen. In the course of the talks with the USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze the sides pointed out that they have an understanding of such global problems as disarmament, elimination of nuclear arsenals, prevention of militarization of outer space, and putting an end to nuclear tests.

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CSO: 5200/1481

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TASS CITES SHULTZ TIME ARTICLE ON INF

LD110737 Moscow TASS in English 0713 GMT 11 May 87

[Text] New York May 11 TASS -- U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz contributed an article to the weekly "TIME", devoted to prospects for concluding a Soviet-U.S. agreement on eliminating intermediate-range missiles from Europe.

Shultz believes that the United States and the USSR "appear to be nearing an agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF)". "Such an agreement is not assured -- our negotiators still have important work before them -- but if it is concluded, it would constitute the first time in 25 years of U.S.-Soviet arms control talks that significant and verifiable reductions in any category of offensive nuclear weapons had taken place".

Shultz stressed that the administration regarded such an agreement as being in U.S. interests. Shultz opposed the attempts "to link an INF agreement to conventional force reductions" by the Warsaw Treaty member states, stressing that this would be tantamount to killing an agreement. He argued, however, that there existed an "imbalance" in this field between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty.

It is clear from the U.S. secretary of state's article that Washington and its allies do not intend to abandon the doctrine of "flexible response" underlying the NATO's strategy, which is known to stipulate the launching of a first nuclear strike.

"Even after an INF agreement, NATO would retain a robust deterrent," he writes. "More than 4,000 U.S. nuclear weapons would still be in Europe".

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CSO: 5200/1481

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TASS CITES SHULTZ BALTIMORE SUN ARTICLE ON INF

LD122028 Moscow TASS in English 2015 GMT 12 May 87

[Text] Washington May 12 TASS -- U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz declared in support of the conclusion of an agreement on the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe between the USA and the USSR. He expressed cautious optimism about the possibility of reaching such an arrangement, which, he said, will be decidedly in the interest of the United States and NATO. "The United States and the Soviet Union appear to be nearing an agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces", the head of the U.S. foreign policy department writes in a lengthy article published by THE BALTIMORE SUN today. "Such an agreement is not assured -- our negotiators still have important work before them -- but if it is concluded, it would constitute the first time in 25 years of U.S.-Soviet arms control talks that significant and verifiable reductions in any category of offensive nuclear weapons had taken place".

Touching upon "doubts" of a number of West European leaders about this problem, George Shultz expressed the opinion that an agreement on the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear forces from Europe should not be linked to conventional arms reductions in the area. He emphasizes that linking an intermediate-nuclear forces agreement to conventional-force reductions, which will undoubtedly take more years to negotiate, would be tantamount to introducing a "killer amendment".

At the same time, the U.S. secretary of state made it plain that the United States is not at all striving for ridding Europe of nuclear arms completely and is prepared already now to "balance" the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear forces and shorter-range missiles with modernization of other nuclear systems. George Shultz notes that "even after an agreement NATO would retain a robust deterrent. More than 4,000 U.S. nuclear weapons would still be in Europe, on aircraft that could penetrate deep into the Soviet Union, and on remaining missiles and nuclear artillery. NATO is planning on undertaking modernization of several of these systems. Also, several hundred submarine-launched ballistic-missile warheads would remain available to the supreme NATO commander," George Shultz writes.

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CSO: 5200/1481

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR'S VORONTSOV VISITS ROME TO DISCUSS INF PROGRESS

Meets Italian CP Head

LD112126 Moscow TASS in English 2042 GMT 11 May 87

[Text] Moscow May 11 TASS--A meeting took place here today between Yuliy Vorontsov, member of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR first deputy foreign minister, and Alessandro Natta, general secretary of the Italian Communist Party, who was informed of the Soviet position and the situation of the Soviet-American talks in Geneva on nuclear and space weapons.

A. Natta pointed out that the ICP stood for the immediate signing of an agreement on medium-range missiles in Europe as the first step to eliminating nuclear weapons.

Meets Andreotti

LD120219 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1535 GMT 11 May 87

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] Italian Foreign Affairs Minister Andreotti today received Comrade Vorontsov, first deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, who has arrived in Rome. On the instruction of the Soviet leadership, Comrade Vorontsov briefed him on the USSR's position and the state of affairs at the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons at Geneva. During the conversation, the Italian side's attention was drawn to Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's latest proposals on eliminating medium-range missiles and operational and tactical weapons in Europe. Andreotti stressed that the historical opportunity to begin eliminating nuclear weapons must not be lost.

Meets Fanfani

LD121856 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1830 GMT 12 May 87

[Text] Fanfani, chairman of the Italian Council of Ministers, has received Vorontsov, USSR first deputy minister of foreign affairs, who is in the Italian capital. During a conversation, the head of the Italian Government was informed of the Soviet position and the state of affairs at the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons in Geneva. The main focus of attention in the conversation was the possibility of achieving an accord on the elimination of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe, which has emerged.

Further Details

AU130911 Rome ANSA in English 0846 GMT 13 May 87

[Text] (ANSA) Rome -- The Soviet Union and the United States could reach an agreement for the dismantlement of their medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe by the end of September and the nuclear war-heads deployed on them could be destroyed by the year's end, according to Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Yuliy Vorontsov.

Addressing a press conference here after meeting Italian Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani and Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti, he said the war-heads should be destroyed "where they are now, in other words, before all European public opinion".

"It would be an event of historical importance and a very important step towards (total) nuclear disarmament", he added as he repeated the Soviet offer for a "zero option" on short-range missiles, too.

Short-range missiles are classified as those with a flight range of from 500 to 1,000 kilometers. Medium-range or intermediate missiles cover from 1,000 to 5,000 kilometers. When the range is above 5,000 kilometers, the missiles are classified as strategic.

According to Vorontsov, the Soviet Union is also ready to start negotiations on conventional arms, but "The West seems to have no hurry in getting the talks going". He denied alleged Soviet superiority in conventional arms.

Vorontsov added that a U.S. proposal for a 50-percent reduction in strategic nuclear weapons was "not bad at all", but he argued that it leaves out the fundamental problem of space weapons as planned in the Reagan administration's Strategic Defense Initiative, otherwise known as "Star Wars".

"An agreement to eliminate half the strategic nuclear arms should be accompanied by a Soviet and American commitment not to put arms into space", he said, disclosing that Moscow is studying the U.S. proposal and will make a "more balanced" counter-proposal.

According to Vorontsov, once the two superpowers' strategic arsenals were eliminated, talks could start with countries like France and Britain on their national nuclear forces. Asked about the prospects for a joint European defense force, he said he would prefer not to comment while waiting to see what this could mean in relationship to NATO. But he said the Soviet Union is waiting "anxiously" for a West European reply to the Soviet-American "zero option" proposals on intermediate-range missiles.

"We should like to see a responsible attitude in Western Europe", he said. "If minor moves are started within the Atlantic alliance, the missiles will stay where they are".

"The situation is paradoxical", Vorontsov added. "It seems as though the Europeans like our SS20s. We are truly surprised by European opposition to the zero option. It is as if Chernobyl had been forgotten".

In other points, he described the Italian position on the nuclear disarmament agreement being debated by the Soviet Union and the United States as "serious and very responsible", adding that Italy is "fully aware there is no time to lose".

Apart from the Italian Government leaders, Vorontsov also met the Vatican's cardinal secretary of state, Agostino Casaroli, and Italian Communist Party Secretary, Alessandro Natta.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TASS: DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER GIVES MESSAGE TO SWEDISH PREMIER

PM131600 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 May 87 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Message Conveyed"]

[Text] Stockholm, 12 May -- Swedish Prime Minister I. Carlsson today received V.M. Nikiforov, special representative of USSR Chairman of the Council of Ministers V.M. Ryzhkov and USSR deputy foreign minister, who conveyed a message from the head of the Soviet Government.

I. Carlsson thanked him for the message, which the Swedish Government values as evidence of the continuing development and deepening of direct dialogue in various forms between the leadership of Sweden and the Soviet Union and which is in the fundamental interests of both states and peoples.

The meeting discussed topical questions bound up with the new Soviet initiatives to eliminate medium-range and operational and tactical missiles and other proposals on problems of European security. In this context the USSR received with satisfaction the Swedish Government's positive evaluation of the initiatives.

Certain questions of Soviet-Swedish relations of mutual interest were examined in a spirit of trust and mutual understanding. I. Carlsson confirmed Sweden's sincere interest in maintaining stable, good-neighborly relations between Sweden and the Soviet Union to the benefit of the peoples of both countries, Europe, and the whole world. The following were present during the conversation: On the Swedish side P. Schori, undersecretary of state at the Swedish Foreign Ministry, and on the Soviet side B.D. Pankin, USSR ambassador to the USSR, and N.N. Uspenskiy, chief of a USSR Foreign Ministry Department.

A detailed discussion also took place between V.M. Nikiforov and Swedish Foreign Minister S. Andersson.

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CSO: 5200/1482

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TASS CRITICIZES UK FOR ADHERENCE TO NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

LD112113 Moscow TASS in English 2011 GMT 11 May 87

[Text] Moscow May 11 TASS -- By TASS News Analyst Vladimir Matyash:

Thirty years ago, on May 15, 1957, Great Britain detonated its first H-bomb. That move came in line with the fundamental principle of the military strategy followed by NATO to which Britain belongs -- the principle of "nuclear intimidation" or "nuclear deterrence."

Hence, the constant desire of NATO leaders to fill Western Europe, Britain included, with in creasingly lethal types of nuclear armaments that pose a threat to international peace and security.

In the opinion, of the current British Cabinet, security can be founded only on the policy of strength, while nuclear weapons allegedly prevent not only a nuclear, but also a conventional war from breaking out in Europe and, therefore, a world without nuclear weapons would be less stable and more dangerous for all of us.

London evidently does not realize to this date the extent of evil of the ideology and policy of "nuclear deterrence." It is a totally bankrupt concept, especially in the current situation when an acute nuclear threat looms dark over mankind and when the policy should be built on realities and proceed from the need for coexistence of the countries of different social systems.

The stance of the U.S.S.R. on the concept of "nuclear deterrence" was set forth in no uncertain terms by Mikhail Gorbachev during his recent talks with the British prime minister in Moscow.

We would like, however, to make several points on the matter.

First, this instrument is not failure-proof. As time goes on the risk of an accidental outbreak of nuclear war is becoming greater. It is a Bickford fuse to an explosive charge that can destroy civilisation.

Secondly, "deterrence" is a policy of blackmail and threats, and hence, a constant factor spurring the arms race and bringing about bigger tension.

Thirdly, the logic of "deterrence", that is, a buildup and modernization of weapons, means the subordination of a nation's policy to the interests of militarism with all

the grave consequences both for the well-being of the people and for democracy itself.

It is absolutely clear that to bank on nuclear weapons as a "guardian and guarantor" of peace and security, means to work toward bigger tension in Europe and undermine international peace and security.

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CSO: 5200/1482

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

PRAVDA RESPONDS TO BBC ON ASIAN NUCLEAR BUILDUP

PM121105 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 May 87 Second Edition p 5

["Rejoinder" by Ye Yevgenyev "BBC Without Commentary"]

[Text] A recent BBC news broadcast "covered" the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva in their Asian aspect, so to speak. Of itself that is something normal. The question of eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe interests and concerns everyone as a possible first real step toward a nuclear-free world. But "people in the Far East," the BBC announced, "are very much afraid that an agreement on reducing nuclear missiles in Europe will enable the USSR to build up and update its nuclear forces in Asia."

Reducing in Europe in order to build up in Asia! Truly the Soviets' perfidy has no bounds, not even intercontinental bounds. The BBC does not name the source where it dug up this nonsense. It also refrains from making comments of its own. That is obviously no accident. After all even the most benighted editor in that corporation should know that the agreement to eliminate medium-range missiles in Europe will, if it is reached, lead at the same time to a major reduction of armaments of this class in Asia, restricting it to 100 warheads on each side, and will open the path to talks on the fate of the remaining medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles in this region. But the BBC keeps quiet about that. Just as it keeps quiet about how it is above all the United States that is now engaging in building up and modernizing nuclear forces in Asia, stationing Lance missiles in South Korea and nuclear weapon-carrying aircraft at the Misawa base in Japan.

Past masters! They have thundered into the air. Sown suspicions. Put people on their guard. And then not a word, they sidestep the issue. They are merely supplying information, they say, and you have to decide for yourselves. A tested Western method of obscuring the issue. But things are evidently in a bad way for London's opponents of a nuclear-free Europe if they are seeking nameless allies in such far-off places. And that indeed is information to be pondered.

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CSO: 5200/1481

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRG GOVERNMENT RECEIVES SOVIET DRAFT TREATY

LD041624 Hamburg DPA in German 1406 GMT 4 May 87

[Excerpts] Bonn (DPA) — The Soviet draft treaty for the zero option on intermediate-range missiles with a range of 1,000-5,500 km (LRINF) [long-range INF] has been sent to the Federal Government today. Government spokesman Friedhelm Ost confirmed that the text was placed at their disposal by the American side.

At the same time Western diplomats in Bonn were stressing the American inclination toward accepting the zero option, not only for these weapons systems, but also for intermediate-range missiles with a shorter range (SRINF) [short-range INF] of 500-1,000 km. With the background of confusing differences of opinion between the FDP on the one side and spokesman for the CDU/CSU parliamentary groups on the other, diplomats who are regarded as authoritative stated that they were hoping for European unity on this question. [passage omitted]

Besides the Soviet draft treaty on intermediate-range missiles with a range of 1,000-5,500 km, the Federal Government has also received the version of the verbal Soviet offers on extending the zero option to missiles with a range of 500-1,000 km. Moscow has supposedly not yet expressed itself in writing on this. On this Western diplomats are of the opinion that some Soviet positions were capable of being negotiated. Among these may also be the demand that the 72 old Pershing-1A missiles belonging to the Bundeswehr should be included in a zero option because the nuclear warheads that belong to them are under American control.

Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl will take a position on the question of missiles in a government statement this Thursday. It is expected in Bonn that in this Kohl will announce a framework for possible later decisions but will not yet announce any final position. Diplomatic circles say that this could not be made until after further European coordination. Kohl had said on Sunday in Strasbourg that he thought European agreement would be possible by the end of the month.

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CSO 5200/2530

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRG'S GENSCHER, USSR'S VORONTSOV DISCUSS DISARMAMENT

'Serious' Examination

LD061614 Hamburg DPA in German 1423 GMT 6 May 87

[Text] Bonn (DPA) — Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher today again gave an assurance that the Federal Government was examining the disarmament drafts put forth by the Soviet Union "seriously". Following a 1½-hour talk with Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Yuliy Vorontsov, the Foreign Ministry announced that both sides were "interested in improving relations."

Vorontsov, the chief Soviet negotiator in Geneva, came to Bonn 24 hours before the start of the missile debate in the Bundestag to brief the Federal Government on the latest state of the negotiations from the Soviet point of view. Vorontsov stressed the Soviet interest in "early results in all areas that are the subject of the disarmament negotiations."

In the talk, Genscher said that the Federal Government would bring the results of the promised "serious examination" into its consultations with the allies. The examination encompassed both the existing written draft treaty for a zero option for long-range INF missiles (over 1,000 km) and the verbal explanations of a further zero option for intermediate-range missiles with a range of between 500 and 1,000 km.

Genscher placed great value on the statement that progress must be made both in the negotiations on chemical weapons and in the talks on a mandate for new Vienna negotiations on conventional stability in Europe. Regarding the Soviet response, the Foreign Ministry merely said that the Soviet guest had pointed to the interest already publicly expressed by his country on this topic.

Vorontsov on Status of Geneva Talks

LD061833 Hamburg DPA in German 1729 GMT 6 May 87

[Text] Bonn (DPA) — According to Yuliy Vorontsov, chief Soviet negotiator in Geneva, the long-range INF missiles are the Soviet Union's main goal in the search for zero options.

On the day before the Bundestag debate on the intermediate-range issue, Vorontsov said that the aspect of verification in an agreement on these missiles with a range of over 1,000 km is still to be negotiated, but could be ready by October at the latest. He also said that if during this stage the zero option for short-range INF missiles with a range of between 500 and 1,000 km — the subject of such intense controversy in Bonn — were attained, "then that would please us," but it is by no means a condition. Vorontsov made it clear that Moscow expects to be able to reach agreement later with the other superpower, the United States.

Earlier, Vorontsov briefed Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Horst Teltschik, the chancellor's adviser, on the status of the Geneva negotiations.

Vorontsov Holds News Conference

LD062004 Hamburg DPA in German 1803 GMT 6 May 87

[Excerpts] Bonn (DPA) — According to Yuliy Vorontsov, chief Soviet negotiator at the disarmament negotiations in Geneva, the Soviet Government is "firmly convinced" that it will be able to sign a treaty with the United States on a zero-option for long-range INF missiles this year.

Vorontsov, who is also first deputy foreign minister of the USSR, said at a news conference in Bonn today that for his government the zero option for the long-range INF systems is the "main goal." If they succeed at the same time in negotiating a zero solution for the short-range INF missiles "this would please us." But it is in no way a condition. [passage omitted]

Vorontsov returned to Geneva this evening and, with the remark to the Bonn correspondents that he had briefed them to the same extent as he had his official partners in the talks, left behind an impression of unusual openness.

The two draft treaties of the superpowers in Geneva on the long-range INF option lie close together "and can also be fully coordinated," Vorontsov said. He gave examples of the still open verification questions. The Americans believe that verification of a halt to production and its continued observance is adequate from "outside the factory gate." The Soviets want verification in the factories.

Moscow wants to make the scrapping a media event. Vorontsov announced invitations to the Bonn correspondents for early 1988 to watch the scrapping of the SS-20 missiles, because "the world has not yet experienced the start of the destruction of nuclear weapons."

In the case of the old "German" Pershings, the Soviets are only interested in the nuclear warheads. Vorontsov made it clear that the nuclear arming comes under U.S. great power responsibility

and is thus also part of what is being negotiated on in Geneva. The 72 type 1A rockets and their launch ramps, which are in the possession of the Bundeswehr, are, like any possible conventional warheads, of no interest to Moscow, he said.

The Soviet chief negotiator, one of Moscow's most respected diplomats, also expressed the opinion that it would be possible to sign the long-range INF zero option, under which 100 missiles would remain on each side outside Europe, by September, or October at the latest. The U.S. side also believes this: autumn is the latest for achieving ratification by summer 1988, because otherwise the U.S. presidential election campaign and the installation of a new government in 1989 would postpone disarmament by at least 2 years. The Soviet diplomat thus agrees with the timescale generally accepted in the West.

Vorontsov reaffirmed Moscow's interest in conventional disarmament and accused the West of negotiating too hesitantly in Vienna on a mandate for this. On the long-range INF zero option the chief negotiator said that the principal clauses of the treaty have been in existence since the Soviet-U.S. summit in Reykjavik in October 1986. In Geneva it is only a matter of filling them in technically.

When the question of an agreement on the short-range INF comes up he hopes that the Federal Government's final stance will be 'put forth with one voice.' here, however, he also made clear Moscow's opinion that the two superpowers could find a basis for understanding relatively easily. Here the same scheme could be applied as in the long-range INF sphere, with a remaining stock of missiles with equal, global upper limits.

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CSO: 5200/2530

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

KOHL MAKES GOVERNMENT STATEMENT ON MISSILES

LD070345 Hamburg DPA in German 0713 GMT 7 May 87

[Text] Bonn (DPA)--Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl is making a decision by the Federal Government on the Soviet proposal for a zero option in the field of short-range intermediate-range missiles dependent on the presentation of a treaty text. In a government statement, described as an interim report, on the state of the Geneva talks, Kohl said in the Bundestag today that there are differences between Soviet statements in Moscow and Geneva and the explanations given to the Federal Government the day before in Bonn. "That shows the justification of the Federal Government's desire that the Soviet Union should explain its position on this in writing as well."

The Soviet Union's Geneva proposal goes beyond the framework of the negotiations because it calls for the inclusion of the Pershing-1A rockets which are with the FRG Armed Forces whereas an intermediate-range [missile] agreement was to include only U.S. and Soviet carriers and launchers but not the systems of third parties.

The chancellor emphasized that fundamental decisions of arms control policy cannot be taken on the basis of "mere verbal explanations since the final meaning of which is not certain." "We cannot make decisions on future policy in the central field of our security on the basis of merely agency reports."

The chancellor expressed at the same time his support for a Soviet-U.S. agreement on a global zero solution for long-range intermediate-range missiles. The conclusion of such a treaty is still possible this year and is thoroughly welcomed by the Federal Government. A zero solution restricted only to Europe and not active globally for this category of weapons would make verification more difficult in Kohl's view.

Kohl, who thus supports separate agreements for the reduction of long- and short-range intermediate-range missiles, said that the Soviet Union as well has verbally made such a proposal in Geneva. The chancellor said that the Soviet proposals will have to be examined carefully. The draft treaty for missiles with a range over 1,000 km which had been presented is being assessed "with care and responsibility."

Kohl pointed out that even following a zero solution for the long-range missiles there still remains in existence dangerous potentials with the short-range nuclear weapons, as well as with chemical and conventional weapons. They pose a particular threat to the FRG and to the allied forces stationed there.

The chancellor forcefully expressed the view that Europe should "finally speak with one voice". This is also the aim of the Federal Government's consultations. On questions of disarmament and arms control there must be steady progress and it should be ensured that the momentum is maintained, the process continued, and serious arms imbalances removed.

Kohl defended the present position of his government which has avoided fixing a position. The opposition has fought this "consistent course" with "violent propaganda" and has accompanied it with "dark predictions". The Federal Government has been the subject of "irrational and emotional hostility and is confronted with calls to breach the alliance and with anti-American mobilization." But many critics of government policy have made the most serious errors in their assessment of the interests and the flexibility of the Soviet Union.

If the government had followed the "hasty advice of the opposition" it would have been in an "irresponsibly worse position today", Kohl said. The decisive things at the negotiating table are perseverance and the consistency of one's own interests. Unilateral concessions would be pocketed without anything in return.

Kohl underscored that the preservation of peace in freedom is the foremost goal of the Federal Government's security policy. What is at stake here is to prevent war of every kind, both nuclear and conventional. This is served by NATO's deterrent strategy, to which there is at present no alternative. The chancellor stressed that for the effectiveness and credibility of that strategy there must continue to be nuclear and conventional forces in a balanced relationship. "For that reason our alliance cannot completely renounce nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future."

The government however still seeks disarmament and arms control. It wants to create peace with ever fewer weapons. "We are striving for arms control agreements which ensure enhanced security for all parties at as low and balanced a level of forces as possible." There must be no zones of lesser security.

Any other action by the Federal Government than close examination is irresponsible, the foreign minister said. He also pointed out that the chief Soviet negotiator in Geneva, Yuliy Vorontsov, had signaled a clear readiness to negotiate on all elements during his visit to Bonn Wednesday.

In this connection the foreign minister defended the policy of detente which had as a characteristic not trying to achieve superiority. The zero option for long-range intermediate missiles, which is "within reach," is one of many encouraging signs in disarmament and security policy and must be praised as the particular success of German disarmament policy. Genscher spoke of his regret about differences of opinion within the alliance and mentioned the continuing efforts by the Federal Government to bring about a unified position. The differences in opinion were not caused by the Federal Government.

Genscher expects positive influence on the overall field of East-West policy from the disarmament developments which are beginning. The policy of openness now being put into practice by Moscow is in the particular interest of the Germans. But therefore "we also have to be ready to accept the word of the other side."

Kohl referred to the military potential of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact and said he thinks it is far superior to that of the United States and the Western alliance. The East has geographic and geostrategic advantages. According to the Soviet Union's military doctrine, military conflicts would not be carried out on its own territory, but on the enemy's territory. "All this points objectively to an invasion capability by the Warsaw Pact with regard to Western Europe, while our forces are not suited to offensives and operations to seize territory in terms of directives, size, and structure."

The chancellor gave a positive assessment of the policy of the Soviet Government under General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. Gorbachev's political course is being followed 'with interest and sympathy.' On the basis of a secure defense capability the Federal Government is striving for comprehensive cooperation with the Soviet Union and its allies. This applies also to the sphere of disarmament and arms control.

Kohl referred to a series of German-Soviet agreements which were signed recently. Further bilateral visits and accords have been agreed. In this connection Kohl welcomed the visit to the FRG by Bulgarian head of state Todor Zhivkov on 2 June. This underlines that relations with other Warsaw Pact states are on the right track.

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CSO 5200/2530

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRG'S GENSCHER URGES SUPPORT FOR EAST-WEST OPENNESS

LD031231 Hamburg DPA in German 1026 GMT 3 May 87

[Excerpt] Bonn (DPA) — Speaking against the background of the domestic controversy about the zero option for intermediate-range nuclear missiles, West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP) has urged that CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev be "taken at his word." At the opening of the 33d German-American Friendship Week in Ansbach, Genscher also called on Europeans to maintain their solidarity with the United States. U.S. President Ronald Reagan and his secretary of state, George Shultz, had already made it clear that they could accept Gorbachev's proposal for a zero option for intermediate-range missiles, not only of longer but also of shorter-range missiles (500 to 1,000 km).

Despite the continuing differences in values, West and East are demanding cooperation and not confrontation. A Soviet Union opening up internally to outside is a better partner for the West than a Soviet Union which has shut itself off and indurate, said the foreign minister, without speaking in concrete terms about the rejection of an expanded zero option by leading union politicians. Better East-West relations are in the common interest of the West. If possibilities for a turn to the better loom, as at the Gorbachev-Reagan meeting in Reykjavik, then it is first of all a matter for the Europeans "to contribute to a constructive development through far-sighted and realistic plans for the future".

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CSO: 5200/2530

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRG: FDP'S BANGEMANN EXPRESSES SUPPORT FOR ZERO OPTION

FDP Chairman's Support

LD011344 Hamburg DPA in German 1236 GMT 1 May 87

[Text] Neumuenster (DPA) — FDP Chairman Martin Bangemann has spoken out in support of the zero option in INF missiles. He was speaking at a congress of the Schleswig-Holstein FDP. Bangemann said in Neumuenster on Friday that even during the discussion about the NATO two-track decision his party had urged the elimination of intermediate-range missiles. It was still serious about this today. The FDP knew that the conventional superiority of the Soviet Union could become a threat. Precautions must be taken against this, but progress in the disarmament debate must not be "hindered" by new factors. If it turned out that Moscow was not serious about conventional disarmament, "we can still reach new solutions."

Bangemann Views Total Disarmament

LD031222 Hamburg DPA in German 0855 GMT 3 May 87

[Text] Hamburg (DPA) — In the controversy about a joint response from the FRG to the Soviet offer to reduce nuclear intermediate-range missiles in Europe, Martin Bangemann, the FDP leader, does not expect a quarrel within the coalition. "We aren't having a row in the coalition, and furthermore we don't need to have one," the Federal economics minister said today in an interview with Sueddeutscher Rundfunk/South German Radio.

The CDU/CSU disarmament experts had, he said, made it clear again and again that they too favored a zero option for shorter-range missiles as well. The decisive point, according to Bangemann, was "in the event of this zero option, how do we bring about a further set of disarmament talks concerning reduction of conventional forces on the Soviet side, and what should the formula look like by which we introduce this intention of ours into the first agreement on the elimination of intermediate-range missiles."

Urges Coalition Unity

LD041245 Hamburg DPA in German 1112 GMT 4 May 87

[Text] Mainz (DPA) — In the words of its federal chairman, Martin Bangemann, the FDP intends to discuss the Soviet disarmament proposals "in with calm and order" with the coalition partners. There must be no coalition policy row on this, Bangemann said after a presidium session of his party today while speaking to journalists in Mainz. Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher's viewpoint is completely right. There are not even any differences in detail between the individual FDP Presidium members.

Bangemann said that in the event of a zero solution the conventional predominance of the USSR will have greater effect. This was why disarmament efforts in this area, together with a worldwide proscription of chemical weapons, is necessary. The disarmament process must be carried out in stages. The change-over will take years. The passage of time offers the guarantee that "we retain control."

/9274

CSO: 5200/2530

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRG: BILD INTERVIEW WITH STRAUSS ON DISARMAMENT

DW041355 Hamburg BILD in German 2 May 87 pp 1, 3

[Interview with CSU Chairman Franz Josef Strauss by Hans-Erich Bilges; date and place not given]

[Text] for the first time, CSU leader Strauss has involved himself in the debate about Gorbachev's disarmament proposals. In an interview with *BILD*, he sharply rejects the zero solution for all intermediate-range missiles in Europe. He states: "It is about time to create a common European nuclear weapons potential. The British-French talks on the issue could be a beginning."

Bild: Should all intermediate-range missiles be removed?

Strauss: It is correct that the total dismantling of longer and shorter range intermediate-range missiles would free Europe from the threat of the Soviet SS-20 and SS-4 as well as SS-12/22 and SS-23 missiles. However, the FRG would still be threatened by Soviet short-range missiles with a range of up to 1,000 km (*Bild* footnote: Other politicians refer to short-range missiles as missiles having a range not exceeding 500 km). In addition, the Warsaw Pact is still considerably superior in conventional weapons.

That is why our position can only be that there must be no zero solution for intermediate-range missiles. The Soviet short-range potential must be reduced. There must be no pure zero solution as long as the Warsaw Pact is superior in short-range missiles

and conventional weapons.

To begin with, a balance of strength must be created. We must not voluntarily become defenseless, because Gorbachev has not abandoned the Soviet Union's world revolutionary, geostrategic goals.

Bild: Would the Federal Republic's security be jeopardized?

Strauss: Yes, it would, if no balance were achieved, as I described earlier. In other words, if no double zero option were to be achieved, in view of the considerable Soviet superiority in short-range missiles and conventional weapons. Increasing the number of Bundeswehr divisions from 12 to 18, as suggested by Helmut Schmidt, would be impossible for several reasons, ranging from the numerical strength (650,000 troops) and the financial burden involved, to political psychological problems.

Bild: Should Europe cooperate more closely?

Strauss: I have always advocated strengthening the European pillar of NATO. But that should not lead us to pull away from the United States. We Europeans do not have as much room as the United States has. Yet, the fact that 320 million Europeans are unable to set up a military defense, which alone would constitute an effective deterrent or war-preventing potential against 200 million Russians, in my view is a sign of weakness.

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CSU 5200/2530

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRG: SPD'S SCHMIDT OUTLINES VIEWS ON DISARMAMENT

LD061248 Hamburg DPA in German 1126 GMT 6 May 87

[Text] Hamburg (DPA)--In the opinion of former SPD Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, a bilateral zero solution in INF weapons would be "the first step to real disarmament" since the end of World War II. "Germans in West and East are bound to be deeply perturbed and concerned if the zero solution does not succeed," Schmidt writes in the latest edition of the weekly paper DIE ZEIT, of which he is coeditor.

Schmidt does not share the fear that in the absence of short-range INF missiles the West would be dangerously at risk from a superiority in the conventional forces of the East. The extent of the present Soviet superiority is "generally exaggerated," he writes. Moreover, the West would be left with nuclear artillery, nuclear-equipped combat aircraft, and other nuclear weapons. As defense minister he has seen the "military capability" of the Bundeswehr for himself. Schmidt urged the integration of the French, German, and Benelux armed forces in order to raise the level of deterrence.

The former federal chancellor regards the USSR's readiness for a zero solution as a result of NATO counterarmament with U.S. intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe. "If a bilateral renunciation of INF missiles in Europe is achieved, this would be a great, albeit belated, personal triumph for me," the SPD politician writes. In this he underlines his shared respon-

sibility for the NATO dual-track decision in 1979. Since 1980 he has urged a bilateral zero option "on his own initiative" on several occasions. As a result of the NATO dual-track decision, stipulating that there should only be counterarmament if the USSR is not prepared for negotiations on the withdrawal of its SS-20 INF missiles within 4 years, the zero option has been a Western proposal right from the start, Schmidt stresses. Soviet party leader Mikhail Gorbachev is now evidently also prepared to accept the zero option for short-range INF missiles. "We should take him at his word."

Schmidt believes the reason for Gorbachev's and Reagan's readiness to agree on a zero option lies in the two politicians' desire for foreign policy successes and economic problems. "The USSR spends about 12-14% of its GNP on defense each year — 2 times as much as the United States, 4 times as much as the West Europeans, and 12 times as much as the Japanese." Owing to loss of prestige on the domestic policy front, Reagan also needs "a convincing success urgently," which he cannot expect in the economic field "due to the catastrophic U.S. budget deficit," Schmidt concludes.

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CSO 5200/2530

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRG COALITION PARTIES DIFFER ON SOVIET PROPOSAL

LD061801 Hamburg DPA in German 1501 GMT 6 May 87

[Excerpt] Bonn (DPA) — The Federal Government and the Bonn coalition parties will enter a Bundestag debate tomorrow with what are basically different positions on the Soviet proposal for a double zero option for intermediate-range missiles in Europe. A "missile summit" with Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl today, in which party chairmen Franz Josef Struss (CSU) and Martin Bangemann (FDP), Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, and Defense Minister Manfred Woerner took part, brought them no closer together. Following the meeting in the Chancellor's Office it was said that the known standpoints were stated "fairly rigid."

The FDP has a positive attitude toward Mikhail Gorbachev's proposal for complete disarmament of both the long-range INF (more than 1,000 km) and the short-range missiles (500-1,000 km) — the proposal that has also been positively received in the United States. The CDU/CSU, however, is initially in favor only of an immediate withdrawal of the longer-range systems.

Kohl, who received support for his position today from Belgian Prime Minister Wilfried Martens, reaffirmed today that he will begin the parliamentary debate with an "interim report." In Bonn it is assumed that Kohl will take this opportunity to reaffirm the 18 March government statement and also to promise an examination of the further-reaching Soviet proposals.

Kohl also intends to draw attention to the close consultations with the West Europeans with the aim of elaborating a unified line before President Reagan's visit in June. The CDU/CSU and the

FDP have arranged another talk between the party chiefs for 29 May.

The 18 March government statement envisages a zero option only for long-range INF weapons. It approves equal upper limits at a low level for the systems below this. Following his talk with Martens, Kohl told journalists that he considers himself confirmed in this firm but also wait-and-see stance. Furthermore, the battlefield weapons, which threatened mainly the Federal Republic, the "absolute imbalance" in the conventional sphere and the chemical weapons must be disarmed. But he does not want these demands to be understood as linkage. Martens, too, stressed that the negotiations on the zero option for longer-range missiles should not be blocked.

From the remarks by the two Christian Democrat heads of government it was clear that they recommend to the superpowers separate disarmament agreements in the intermediate-range sphere. An agreement on the longer-range missiles is possible this year, they said.

In response to journalists' questions on whether the CDU/CSU and the FDP have succeeded in bringing their positions on a zero option closer together Kohl said this afternoon: "That was not the topic at all today." The meeting in Bonn this morning, in which Ministers Wolfgang Schaueble and Hans Klein, and parliamentary party representatives Alfred Dregger, Theo Waigel, and Wolfgang Mischnick took part, was to prepare for the disarmament debate. [passage omitted]

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CSU: 5200/2530

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRG PRESS VIEWS DEBATE ON DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS

DW051030 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 0505 GMT 5 May 87

[From the Press Review]

[Exerpts] Editorialists today deal with disarmament issues and the debate on Bonn's response to Gorbachev's proposals.

Frankfurter Rundschau writes: The political leadership in Moscow and Washington apparently agree that a historic opportunity is in the offing. Both sides want to achieve success, and both sides also seem to believe they can correct undesirable developments in their own strategy. In this situation, the CDU/CSU has outmaneuvered itself. Its attempts to put a brake on the United States creates a strange impression, because it originates from the camp of Reagan's loyal supporters, the defenders of the U.S. President's policy and the United States' most unyielding allies in the earlier dispute about counterarmament. [passage omitted]

Sueddeutsche Zeitung says: Among the Europeans, the French are the most decided opponents of any zero solution. Paris is still hoping that it will, together with London, be able to define a position that will also be acceptable to the other Europeans. Only such European joint position would stand a chance of being listened to in Washington. While Prime Minister Chirac and his British colleague Mrs Thatcher are largely in agreement, the search for a joint position with Federal Chancellor Kohl failed owing to the fact the Germans have not yet ended their discussion about the proper response to Moscow, states *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*.

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CSO 5200/2530

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRG: SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG ON ZERO SOLUTION

DW061020 Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 6 May 87 p 2

[Report by "MES": "SPD: Bonn Developing Into a Troublemaker"]

[Text] Bonn — The SPD leadership supports acceptance of zero solution proposals regarding intermediate-range missiles "without if's or but's," stating that objections and conditions voiced in the government camp against a comprehensive agreement are irresponsible and make the FRG look like a troublemaker to both the East and West. Chairman Hans-Jochen Vogel emphasized to the SPD Bundestag group on Tuesday the intention of the SPD to urge the Federal Government in Thursday's parliamentary disarmament debate to support the proposals submitted in Geneva. Of special interest in this matter will be the action of the FDP, which must now lay its cards on the table and make sure that the adversaries of a comprehensive zero solution in the CDU/CSU be restrained, and that decisions be made for which Chancellor Kohl alone does not have the power.

Vogel mentioned a constructive attitude of the U.S. Government, which brought closer the conclusion of a treaty and thus a historical breakthrough in disarmament negotiations. The attempt of strong CDU/CSU forces, headed by Group Chairman Alfred Dregger, to enforce deployment of more missiles on FRG territory instead of disarmament is irresponsible and expresses clear mistrust about the U.S. security guarantee.

/9274

CSO: 5200/2530

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

CANADA: OTTAWA CITIZEN ON SRINF, GORBACHEV PROPOSALS

SRINF Issue

Ottawa THE OTTAWA CITIZEN in English 6 Apr 87 p A8

[Text]

The issue of shorter-range intermediate nuclear forces (SRINF) in Europe is fast becoming a stumbling-block in the way of reaching a zero option accord on medium-range missiles (INF) between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. While West Europe's concern is understandable, it should not in the end be allowed to prevent an INF accord.

NATO is right to highlight the 8:1 advantage in SRINF missiles that the Soviets have now, and which would become much more relevant when U.S. cruise and Pershing 2 missiles are removed. It follows that the U.S. should press the Soviets to remove all their shorter-range missiles, or at least reduce them to parity with American ones in Europe.

Alternatively, the Americans should insist on their right to match the SRINF numbers that Moscow decides to keep in Europe. This was the essence of what President Reagan promised French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac in Washington this week. He reassured his visitor that he would remain firm on his right to deploy a force of shorter-range weapons in Europe equal to the Soviet Union's.

Right now the Soviets have nearly 800 SRINF weapons, including battlefield ballistic missiles. The U.S. has only about 100. The Russian ones range up to 1,000 kilometres, the American ones only 120 kms.

Now is the time to exercise maximum pressure on Moscow to do something about its SRINF superiority — not after an INF

agreement is signed. To that extent, Reagan is right to press immediately for what is obviously in the Western alliance's interest. On the other hand, the question of how long he should keep on insisting that an SRINF understanding be part of an INF accord is a crucial negotiating matter that requires delicate treatment.

There are already all kinds of unilateral Soviet promises that they will do something about the problem: In January 1986, Gorbachev offered to freeze his SRINF missiles in the context of an INF accord. At Reykjavik, he offered to negotiate their removal and destruction after an INF agreement. At the end of February, he added that he was ready to begin talks to that end immediately.

What seems to have been forgotten in all this verbiage is that the U.S. already has the right to deploy as many SRINF missiles in Europe as it wants to, provided NATO agrees. Soviet consent is superfluous in the absence of an agreement to the contrary.

In any event, it is in the West's greater security interest to conclude a separate INF accord as soon as possible, provided adequate verification measures are guaranteed. Shorter-range missiles must also be addressed promptly. But bearing in mind the absolute right of NATO to counter Soviet superiority there as elsewhere, their negotiation should not hold up the conclusion of a precedent-setting INF elimination agreement.

Gorbachev Prague Proposals

Ottawa THE OTTAWA CITIZEN in English 11 Apr 87 p B2

[Text]

NATO will be pondering Mikhail Gorbachev's latest arms reduction proposals made in Prague Friday while State Secretary George Shultz wings his way to Moscow to discuss the very same matters on Monday.

The Soviet leader chose to make a new suggestion about short-range missiles to the Central Committee of the Czech Communist party, instead of to Shultz. But he also made sure that his speech was televised so the whole world would be in on the scoop.

In these circumstances, it's difficult to avoid the conclusion that propaganda and symbolism were his motivating factors.

Still, the basic elements of his speech deserve close attention. He focused on the shorter-range Intermediate Nuclear Forces (SRINF). He proposed separate negotiations to reduce and eventually eliminate them. And he ruled out any linkage between SRINF and the longer-range INF negotiations.

The missiles featured in his Prague address are mostly Soviet SS-21s, 22s and 23s. Gorbachev referred specifically to those having a range of 500 to 1,000 kilometres, and called on both sides to freeze them initially.

The West has only about 100 SRINFs and theirs have a much shorter range. In fact, the Soviets have an 8:1 advantage.

At first glance, the Soviet proposal has both advantages and disadvantages for the West. The elimination of Soviet superiority in this category would be welcomed by NATO, and the European countries in particular. So would the plan to freeze them at the beginning. But, if this meant that NATO would have to agree never to bring its numbers up to the Soviet level, that would not be acceptable.

The Soviets also propose that the SRINF talks be between NATO and Warsaw Pact members, starting with a meeting of foreign ministers, and that the missile talks include ones on conventional forces and armaments.

It's doubtful if NATO would agree to the first part. Up to now nuclear negotiations have been the prerogative of the two super-powers whose forces are being addressed.

On the other hand, the Soviets seem to be signalling that they now agree to the Western suggestion of pact-to-pact talks on conventional forces. If so, that is welcome news. So is Soviet confirmation that SRINF talks can commence right away.

The Soviet chief also announced that production of chemical weapons had ceased in the Soviet Union. This could herald a long-awaited breakthrough in the Geneva disarmament conference.

Shultz should pocket the advances in Moscow and go on from there. The real negotiations have just begun.

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CSO: 5220/44

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOVIET OFFICIAL AIRS ARMS PROPOSALS IN LONDON TALKS

Foreign Office Meeting

London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 1346 GMT 29 Apr 87

[Text]

A Soviet minister met his British counterparts in London today to explain his country's attitude to arms control issues in particular proposals for removing intermediate range nuclear weapons from Europe.

Mr Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, the Soviet deputy foreign minister, visited the Foreign Office for a 70-minute meeting with Mr Timothy Renton, the minister responsible for arms control.

The Foreign Office said later he summarised recent developments in Soviet arms control policies including the talks in Moscow, involving U.S. Secretary of State Mr George Shultz, and the negotiations with the U.S. in Geneva.

The Soviet minister did not deliver a copy of the draft treaty on the proposals for the removal of intermediate range nuclear missiles from Europe which was tabled in Geneva two days ago.

He is due to see Mrs Thatcher at Downing Street later today.

Mr Bessmertnykh is one of a number of Soviet envoys visiting European capitals on similar missions.

Meeting With Thatcher

London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 1919 GMT 29 Apr 87

[Article by Tom McMullan]

[Text]

Mrs Thatcher today drew attention to "difficulties" in Soviet proposals for eliminating intermediate range nuclear weapons from Europe, according to a statement issued after talks at Downing Street with the deputy Soviet foreign ministry.

Mr Aleksandr Bessmertnykh saw the prime minister for 50 minutes, and the talks, described as "substantial" were said to have taken place in a good atmosphere.

The statement said Mr Bessmertnykh called to brief Mrs Thatcher on the latest Soviet proposals in Geneva on intermediate and short range nuclear weapons.

The prime minister was said to have reaffirmed the government's commitment to achieving rapid progress in the Geneva negotiations, and emphasised the British Government accepted the zero option for intermediate range nuclear weapons, although would prefer this to be a global zero.

But, according to the statement, Mrs Thatcher drew attention to "a number of difficulties" in the Soviet plans.

She stressed that the alliance was engaged in urgent discussion on the Soviet proposals on shorter range nuclear weapons, and hoped a common position would soon be reached.

Any agreement must preserve Europe's security and take account of the Soviet Union's substantial superiority in both conventional and chemical weapons.

Mr Bessmertnykh is one of a number of Soviet envoys visiting European capitals on similar missions.

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CSO: 5240/080

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

BRIEFS

BESSMERTNYKH, SHULTZ CONFER--Washington, 12 May (TASS)--On Monday, George Shultz, U.S. secretary of state, received A.A. Bessmertnykh, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs, for a conversation during the course of which certain questions concerning Soviet-U.S. relations, including concerning perspectives for talks on questions of limiting and reducing weapons, were discussed. Particular attention was paid to the state of affairs developing around the problem of medium-range and operational and tactical missiles. Yu.V. Dubinin, USSR ambassador in the United States, took part in the conversation. [Text] [Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2013 GMT 11 May 87 LD] /6091

TASS CITES DPRK STATEMENT--Pyongyang, May 12 TASS--People in all countries follow with strong interest the Soviet-U.S. negotiations on medium-range missiles, says a statement by the spokesman for the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) published in Pyongyang today. Arms reduction is the more vital task in the efforts to promote peace and security on earth at the moment when the threat of a nuclear conflict in Europe, Asia and other regions is mounting. The DPRK comes out persistently for delivering mankind of the horrors of thermonuclear catastrophe and will work for the Asian-Pacific region to become a peace zone, free of nuclear weapons, the statement points out. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0839 GMT 12 May 87 LD] /6091

FRG, BELGIAN LEADERS CONFER--Wilfried Martens' 1-day visit to Bonn, where he was meeting West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. The discussions touched essentially on issues of defense and security. Martens underlined the interest of a European stance in matters of defense. The Belgian prime minister indicated to the press that the Belgian and West German Governments do not want to block an agreement on the elimination of intermediate-range missiles. They desire the conclusion of such an agreement, this year if possible. [Text] [Brussels Domestic Service in French 1600 GMT 6 May 87 LD] /9274

FRG: STRAUSS OPPOSES ZERO OPTION--Bonn (DPA)--The chairman of the CSU, Franz Josef Strauss, has spoken out against the pure zero option on INF favored by Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and by the United States. He said this in an interview with BILD newspaper (Saturday's edition), in connection with his demand for a 'strengthening of the European pillar' of NATO. Strauss demanded the creation of a 'common European nuclear weapons potential.' The complete reduction of longer and shorter-range INF does indeed free Europe from the threat of these Soviet weapons; however, the Federal Republic is still in danger from Soviet missiles. In addition to this 'the pronounced superiority of the Warsaw Pact in conventional armaments' remains. As long as this superiority is not removed there can be no 'pure zero option.' 'The balance of strength' has to be created first of all. [Text] [Hamburg; DPA in German 1100 GMT 1 May 67 LG] /9274

FRG: SPD OPPOSES EUROPEAN FORCE--Frankfurt/Oldenburg (DPA)--Disarmament spokesman for the SPD Bundestag group Karsten Voigt has declared his party's clear resistance to proposals by CSU Chairman Franz Josef Strauss for a European nuclear force. Voigt told the Oldenburg NORDWEST-ZEITUNG (Saturday's edition) in Frankfurt that Strauss' proposals revealed that 'leading Christian Democrats never in fact wanted nuclear disarmament.' Their distrust of the U.S. security guarantee for Western Europe has 'now become so great that they are again striving for joint German possession of nuclear weapons.' The real opponents of disarmament are, in the SPD deputy's view, 'not in Washington and Moscow but in Bonn and Munich' at present. Voigt added that if Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher wants to maintain his credibility in foreign policy then he is left with only 'the alternative of, together with the SPD, prevailing over the disarmament opponents in the CDU/CSU or packing his bags and resigning from this government.' [Excerpt] [Hamburg; DPA in German 0004 GMT 2 May 67 LG] /9274

CSO: 5200/1481

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

TASS COMMENTATOR ON SOVIET PROGRAM TO ABOLISH CHEMICAL ARMS

LD111726 Moscow TASS in English 1723 GMT 11 May 87

["Opportunities Must Not Be Lost" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow May 11 TASS -- By TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev:

Real prospects for a successful conclusion of the talks on banning chemical weapons as early as in 1987 have opened during the work of the Disarmament Committee in Geneva of late.

True to its commitments assumed during the Soviet-American summit in Geneva, the USSR exerts tireless efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable international convention on general and complete ban on chemical weapons and on the destruction of the existing stockpiles of chemical warfare agents. Showing bold approaches to these problems, the Soviet side declared for an early and complete elimination of chemical weapons and of the industrial base for their production.

The Soviet programme envisages, specifically, a declaration by all sides of the location of enterprises producing chemical weapons and the start to developing procedures for destroying the relevant industrial base.

The USSR announced the cessation of the production of chemical weapons and embarking on the construction of a special enterprise to destroy such weapons. Much response was evoked at the talks by the statement of the Warsaw Treaty member-countries on the question of prohibiting chemical weapons. The GDR and Czechoslovakia, as well as Bulgaria and Romania advanced the proposals for chemical weapons free zones respectively in the centre of Europe and in the Balkans.

These initiatives of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries made it possible to remove a number of obstacles toward achieving a mutually acceptable arrangement on the complete ban on chemical weapons. The proposals of countries of the socialist community at the talks took into consideration the wishes of other participants in the conference, including the United States and Britain. The Soviet side is striving constantly to dispel distrust of the participants and to invite representatives of the West to an open and honest dialogue on questions of ensuring reliable international control over the observance of the future convention on chemical weapons.

The structure of the future convention has already been adopted in Geneva. Solutions have been found to most of the fundamental questions. The text of many provisions of

the arrangement has been agreed upon. Yet a number of questions remain to be resolved or specified. The provisions of the draft convention on non-production of chemical weapons at civilian enterprises require additional elaboration. The problem of inspections on demand is the cardinal political problem at the talks, and final accord on other provisions of the convention can hardly be expected without its mutually acceptable solution. Some Western countries, specifically France, which recently adopted a programme of intensive arming with chemical weapons, are passive in the quest for mutually acceptable solutions and are mainly engaged in destructive criticism of the proposals of other participants.

The Soviet delegation has to be repelling the attempts of some Western participants in rejecting the principle of equality and equal security when tackling the question of prohibiting chemical weapons.

Serious concern is caused also by the fact that despite undoubted progress at the talks in the Disarmament Committee in Geneva, some countries, including the United States, continue drawing up plans to produce and deploy binary chemical armaments. The legitimate question arises: Do those countries wish to conclude a convention prohibiting chemical weapons or is their real aim to build up their arsenals of chemical warfare agents?

The manifestation of political will, realism and lofty responsibility of all parties to the talks is particularly needed now for ensuring a resolute advance to agreement to eliminate chemical arsenals.

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CSO: 5200/1476

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

GORBACHEV SAID TO OFFER TOTAL TROOP WITHDRAWALS

DW110820 Hamburg BILD in German 11 May 87 pp 1, 12

[Report by "H.-E.B.": "Gorbachev to Reagan: Withdraw All Troops"]

[Text] The Americans and the Russians would withdraw their troops from all of Eastern and Western Europe. That is what Soviet Communist Party chief Gorbachev wants to propose to the West at a Warsaw Pact summit meeting in late May in East Berlin.

According to information obtained by BILD, Western intelligence services and diplomats have informed their governments in Washington, Bonn, and London, as well as NATO, about Gorbachev's most spectacular disarmament plans to date.

According to them, the Soviets would have to withdraw 380,000 soldiers from the "GDR," 80,000 from the CSSR, 65,000 from Hungary, and 40,000 from Poland. The Americans have 310,000 GI's stationed in Western Europe, 250,000 of them in the FRG and in West Berlin.

Gorbachev considers his plan a fulfillment of the Western demand to dismantle the Warsaw Pact's conventional preponderance. Western diplomats and military representatives are already working on responses. They are skeptical. The Americans would have to withdraw their soldiers across the Atlantic. The Soviets, however, would bring their troops back to their own territory, just a few hours away by rail.

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CSO: 5200/1480

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

SOVIET ARMY PAPER ON LATEST PACT INITIATIVES

PM061049 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Apr 87 First Edition p 1

[Editorial: "In Fraternal Unity"]

[Text] The socialist community states are united by their common fundamental interests and aims and by the bonds of their extensive, multifaceted cooperation. The objective need for the increasing rapprochement of the socialist countries stems from the very essence of socialism. The community is growing in strength and ensures reliable protection for its peoples' creative work.

The heart of political cooperation between the fraternal countries has been and still is the practice of collaboration between the ruling communist and worker parties and the improvement and renewal of its methods and forms that make it possible to efficiently and amicably discuss the entire complex of problems relating to socialist building and coordinate a joint foreign policy course. A special role in this is played by regular meetings between the leaders of the fraternal parties and states.

The official friendly visit to the CSSR 9-11 April this year by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev served as a powerful demonstration of the unity and cohesion of Soviet and Czechoslovak Communists and the peoples of the USSR and CSSR.

Opinions were exchanged on topical issues of international politics and the implementation of the policy collectively developed by the socialist community countries and actively conducted by every fraternal country during the recent meeting between M.S. Gorbachev, CPSU Central Committee General Secretary and W. Jaruzelski, PZPR Central Committee first secretary and Polish State Council chairman. "We highly value the opportunity," M.S. Gorbachev noted in his speech at a breakfast in honor of the Polish leader, "to collaborate with Poland and other Warsaw Pact states in the vast amount of intensive work aimed at ridding Europe of its nuclear arsenals, creating a favorable atmosphere for all-around, mutually advantageous cooperation, and strengthening peace and security on the basis that has taken shape as a result of World War II and postwar development."

A special role in the struggle to strengthen security is played by the socialist states' defense alliance -- the Warsaw Pact. As long as the imperialist military bloc NATO exists, the CPSU program stresses, the party considers it essential to contribute in every way possible to improving the activity of the Warsaw Pact as an instrument of collective defense against imperialism's aggressive aspirations and of the joint struggle for lasting peace and the expansion of international cooperation. The soldiers of the fraternal Warsaw Pact armies firmly guard peace and socialism in a

people, inviolable combat formation. For as long as international reaction whips up the arms race, and until it rejects its policy of social revenge and "crusades" against socialism, the CPSU and the Soviet state will do everything necessary to maintain the defense might of our country and the socialist community at the proper level. Soviet people, it is stressed in the CPSU Central Committee address to the Soviet nation in connection with the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, can be sure that under no circumstances will we ever allow imperialism to gain military superiority.

In collaboration with other countries the Warsaw Pact states are determined to strive for the formation of a comprehensive international peace and security system and will continue to promote the expansion and intensification of international cooperation in all spheres -- military, political, economic, and humanitarian -- with the aim of creating such a system. This was stated in the communique of the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers Committee session held in Moscow in spring this year.

The comprehensive proposals put forward by the general secretary of the Central Committee in Prague and in his conversation with U.S. Secretary of State Goldwater are clear evidence of the socialist community countries' readiness to really seek ways to create a truly safe world. In putting forward these proposals the Soviet Union is trying to find compromise solutions to complex problems and is ready to seek mutually acceptable solutions to the entire complex of problems relating to nuclear disarmament and the settlement of regional conflicts. Great interest has been aroused throughout the world by the new Soviet peace initiatives on the questions of eliminating medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles on the European Continent, as well as the proposal to discuss and resolve the question of tactical nuclear forces in Europe, including tactical missiles. The implementation of these proposals would make it possible to considerably lower the level of military confrontation between East and West and increase peoples' security.

While fully supporting the new Soviet peace initiatives, the other fraternal countries of the socialist community also make their own considerable contribution to the struggle against the threat of war. The proposals made by the GDR and the CSSR to create a zone free of chemical weapons in central Europe and also to form a nuclear-free corridor along the border between the Warsaw Pact and NATO states are aimed at strengthening European security. The Soviet Union has stated its willingness to remove all Soviet nuclear means from this corridor on a reciprocal basis and guarantee and respect its nonnuclear status. Broad prospects of improving the atmosphere on the European Continent are opened up by the proposal put forward in Budapest by the Warsaw Pact states to considerably reduce armed forces, tactical nuclear weapons, and conventional arms in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

The undeviating implementation of the socialist community countries' jointly developed policy reveals the fraternal states' increasingly strong unity and cohesion and the enhanced role played by the socialist countries' military-political alliance in the struggle to strengthen peace, security, and international cooperation. The course of the competition between socialism and capitalism and the future of world civilization depend to an enormous extent on the strength of the socialist community, the success of every fraternal country's creative activity, and the degree of purposefulness and coordination in their actions.

The CPSU Central Committee's May Day slogan is like a call to battle to the workers of the world today:

Fraternal greetings to the peoples of the socialist countries!

Long live world socialism -- the mighty and influential force of the present time! -- the community of socialist states grow stronger!

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EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

USSR: REPORTS, COMMENTS ON OPENING OF VIENNA CSCE THIRD STAGE

Kashlev Assesses Progress

PM071311 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 May 87 Morning Edition p 4

[Interview with Yu.B. Kashlev, head of the Soviet delegation to the Vienna meeting of CSCE participant states, by correspondent N. Novikov: "The Third Stage of the Vienna Meeting"--first paragraph is IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Excerpts] Vienna--Next to the complex of the International Congress Center on the banks of the Danube a new building--the Vienna Conference Center--has been built. It was designed by the Viennese architect J. Staber. On 5 May the third stage of the Vienna meeting was opened there. Journalists are saying that the remarkable new building cannot but contribute to the delegations' more dynamic constructive work and the ending on schedule of this important international forum. I asked the head of the Soviet delegation to the Vienna meeting, Ambassador Yu.B. Kashlev, to tell us about the tasks of the third stage and the prospects for the work of the forum, which opened last November.

[Kashlev] During the two preceding stages the implementation of the Helsinki and Madrid accords was discussed and proposals aimed at the further development of the all-European process were introduced. During the third stage, which opened 5 May and will take about 3 months, the delegations from the 35 countries are to elaborate the meeting's final document. It is to enshrine everything positive that has been achieved since Helsinki, as well new accords on joint steps to strengthen security and develop the states' cooperation. The proposals submitted on this account -- and there are some 140 of them -- provide a good basis for the constructive work of the Vienna meeting.

The socialist countries have submitted a large number of important proposals. These include above all Poland's proposal for extending the mandate of the Stockholm conference which paves the way for the parallel discussion of questions of real disarmament and confidence-building measures in the military sphere; Czechoslovakia's proposal for convening an economic forum; and Bulgaria's proposal for an ecological forum. The Soviet proposal for a conference on the development of humanitarian cooperation to be held in Moscow and a number of other proposals have attracted considerable interest.

Questions of military security are one of the central issues at the Vienna meeting. Let me return to the Polish proposal. It is based on the Warsaw Pact countries'

proposals. The USSR and its allies have put forward an integrated program for talks on disarmament in our continent encompassing all types of nuclear missile weapons, armed forces, and conventional arms.

In actual fact, it is a concrete program for the demilitarization of Europe, a program inspired by the new political thinking, a program that creates a unique opportunity for it being last getting disarmament in Europe out of the impasse. A decision on opening such large-scale talks as proposed by M.S. Gorbachev could have been adopted at the Vienna meeting of CSCE participant states' foreign ministers.

Regrettably, the West has so far failed to reply to the Polish proposal, which paves the way to the parallel discussion of questions of real disarmament and the elaboration of confidence-building measures on which agreement was not reached during the initial stage of the conference.

Life, Yu.B. Kashlev said in concluding his interview, is demonstrating with utmost clarity that the peoples of Europe and beyond expect active, vigorous actions from the participants in the Vienna meeting. They are pinning their hopes for strengthened peace and international security and expanded cooperation between countries and peoples on this important international forum.

Delegation Leaders Interviewed

DD102055 Budapest MTI in English 1828 GMT 10 May 87

[Text] Budapest, May 10 (MTI) -- The weekly political magazine programme of Hungarian television "A Het" (The Week) Sunday evening carried interviews with Yuriy Kashlev and Gunter Zimmermann, the leaders of the Soviet and the American delegations participating in the Vienna Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Discussing the development of Soviet-American relations, Zimmermann said:

"There has been a certain rapprochement in our bilateral relations. The Moscow visit of Secretary of State George Shultz was very successful, and a large and important congressional delegation also visited Moscow. We have achieved certain progress at the Geneva talks on the medium-range nuclear missiles, and I hope that all these will also be reflected here, in Vienna. I believe it is very important to keep the entire world, the total picture in view, while negotiating in Vienna. Naturally, what takes place in the East-West relations can have both positive and negative effects on our meeting. We are holding talks at this European follow-up meeting on the issue of confidence-building measures which were the theme of the Stockholm conference that came to a successful completion last September. Now, in another part of Vienna and independently of the European follow-up meeting, discussions are in progress which, hopefully, will lead to talks related to the reduction of conventional weapons. [No closing quotation mark as received].

Question: When can you complete the work with the approval of a resolution, recommendation or some other document?

Zimmermann: "The aim is to end our work by July 31. On behalf of the United States I can say that we are doing everything possible to complete these talks by that time. However, if we do not finish by then, I hope we shall complete our work by autumn."

Question: Can you complete this stage by July 31?

... head of the Soviet delegation, called the attention of the ... program of the demilitarization of Europe put forward by the ... to intensify the work both of the Vienna meeting on ... and of the consultations on new talks dealing with the ... conventional armaments in Europe from the Atlantic to

... countries, the Soviet representative continued, they are ready for ... discussion of the whole range of elements of the mandate of

Polish Confidence-Building Plan Praised

DISPATCH FROM MOSCOW In English 1545 GMT 11 May 87

... TASS ... TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov reports:

... proposed by the leadership of the Polish People's Republic for ... building in Central Europe through a gradual lessening of ... and conventional arms was one of the central topics discussed at ... group on problems of European security. The meeting was held ... the last German-Polish forum in Kiel. Prominent politicians as ... and ... from both countries took part in it.

... report of the SDPR on disarmament problems Egon Bahr said at the forum that the ... "deserve to be answered by Europe". He said Poland came out with ... initiative which suits European interests for its contents and ... emphasized that the comprehensive plan of the Polish leadership ... reduction but also confidence-building in central Europe.

The ... representatives pointed to the need for an early implementation of the ... to eliminate medium-range and shorter-range missiles in Europe.

... of the forum, minister of state in the FRG Foreign Ministry Helmut Scheffer ... the development of commercial and economic relations between the ... and the CMEA. He said East-West economic cooperation would promote ... Europe.

'Innovative' Proposals Praised

DISPATCH FROM MOSCOW In Russian 1730 GMT 11 May 87

... press in the socialist countries is widely discussing the integrated plan ... strengthening confidence-building measures in central ... which was proposed by Poland the other day. Over to our commentator, Vladimir ...

... I expect you are already acquainted with the essence of this plan, Comrades. ... gradual reduction in nuclear and conventional armaments in the region ... the opposing military-political alliances in Europe, and embracing the ... states. Poland is proposing a gradual withdrawal from there and ... of operational and tactical nuclear weapons; as well as conventional ... and foremost those of maximum power and accuracy capable of a sudden

At the same time, it proposes altering the nature of military defense so that they may be mutually recognized and purely defensive, and to determine the type and confidence building that is beyond those of Stockholm.

The innovative nature of the Polish proposals is obvious. At the same time, it is also clear that they are in keeping with the idea of a nuclear free Europe. They are directed toward a reduction in the military confrontation on the continent as a whole, which the Warsaw Pact countries are calling for so much. In the field of disarmament, Poland's initiative is in line with the idea of creating a European home, which was also what they spoke about during his visit to France. It is no accident that many observers are now predicting a broad public and international debate on Lech Walicki's proposal.

I would like to draw your attention to another very important thing: the marked increase in the foreign-policy activity of the socialist countries during the period following the Soviet Union's program of creating a nuclear free Europe. International life has been witness to major initiatives by the socialist countries. These include the Budapest appeal by the Warsaw Pact countries on the elimination of nuclear forces and conventional armaments from the Atlantic to the Pacific; the proposals by the Soviet Union linked with the scrapping of medium range weapons in Europe; the proposal by the socialist countries on delimiting Europe from the rest of the world; and banning chemical weapons; the proposal by Czechoslovakia and the USSR to create a corridor free of nuclear and chemical weapons in Central Europe; and finally proposals by Bulgaria and Romania on the creation of a nuclear free zone in the Balkans.

At the latest session of the committee of foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact member states held recently in Moscow, it was noted that the international policy of accelerating the economic and social development of our countries is being energetically for foreign policy. Socialism is exerting a creative influence on the international situation and world politics. The role of the socialist states in the development of the general European process and in improving it with a steady, long-term nature, continues to grow. The Warsaw Pact is revealing ever more -- especially at the present stage -- its role as a major factor in consolidating peace and security in Europe and throughout the world.

Polish Foreign Minister Speaks

LDL:1942 Moscow TASS in English 1971-01-17 Mar 17

Warsaw, May 17 TASS. Foreign Minister Jacek Kuron recently spoke at the level of military confrontation in Europe, and said prospects for creating the continent free of nuclear and chemical weapons, as well as conventional weapons from the Atlantic to the Pacific. A statement to the press was made at the plenary session of the Warsaw meeting of representatives of the socialist countries on the subject of European security and cooperation with the USSR. Jacek Kuron, member of the Political Bureau of the Polish United Workers' Party, and Foreign Minister, spoke at the meeting. He pointed out in that connection that the Polish proposal by Jacek Kuron, first secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party Central Committee, chairman of the International Council of Women, proposed a series of measures directed at securing peace and building up confidence in Europe.

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CSO: 5299/1480

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

TASS REPORTS ON 14 MAY OPENING OF NEW MBFR ROUND

Soviet Delegation Arrives

LD121253 Moscow TASS in English 1436 GMT 12 May 87

[Text] Vienna May 12 TASS--A Soviet delegation led by V.V. Mikhaylov has arrived in Vienna today to attend the scheduled round of talks on mutual force and arms cuts in central Europe. The talks are due to open on May 14.

Soviet Delegate Speaks

LD141300 Moscow TASS in English 1255 GMT 14 May 87

[Text] Vienna May 14 TASS -- A new round of Vienna talks on Mutual Force and Arms Cuts in Central Europe has opened here today. The first plenary session was addressed by Valerian Mikhaylov, who heads the Soviet delegation. He drew the attention of the participants in the talks to the fresh efforts of the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Treaty member states recently taken to create real opportunities for reaching mutual understanding and specific agreements on the most burning issues concerning the right of countries and peoples to security and peaceful development.

The Soviet representative stressed that the deadlock at the Vienna talks can be ended and their success can be ensured only by the mutual efforts of the sides. There is an opportunity for reaching agreement. The draft agreement tabled by the socialist countries on February 20, 1986, on the initial cut by the Soviet Union and the USA of ground forces and arms with the subsequent non-increase in the level of the forces and arms of the sides and measures in central Europe in that connection, remains in force. In combination with the Stockholm agreement it ensures a good basis for reaching accord.

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MILITARY TESTING AND FOLD-TOGETHER PROPOSALS

SWEDISH PAPER REGRETS INFLUENCE OF USSR MILITARY ON TEST BAN END

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 17 Feb 87 p 2

[Editorial: "Instead of a test ban"]

[Text] The longest test ban observed by a superpower in a quarter of a century is broken. After one and one-half years the Soviets have given up their role as a good example. Thursday morning's nuclear explosion at Semipalatinsk put an end to a phase which had caused many expectations. Now we seem to be back in the sad and tragic old refrain with new nuclear weapon experiments which give no hope for reduction of armaments.

Considering the absolute unwillingness of the Reagan Administration to agree to the Soviet position following Hiroshima Day in 1985, it can be said that there never was a chance for a mutual test ban. We surely still now only know just the Soviets for their part expected an actual development.

Behind the new nuclear weapon test is pressure from the Soviet military leadership to get started again. When Sweden and other countries for a long time demanded a complete test ban it was with the objective of preventing continued weapons development, to break the arms spiral.

In recent years it has certainly been hinted that the nuclear powers no longer needed to carry out nuclear formal nuclear explosions, because important reactions could be studied on advanced computer models. Recently a highly placed American scientist claimed that they have now come down to a necessary minimum of test explosions, since everything cannot be simulated on computers. If this is a total American decision, how will it sound in the Soviet Union, with much smaller computer resources?

The Soviet military began to grumble openly after one year's test ban. The chief of the General Staff Akhromeev on his visit to Stockholm was certainly [less] to this political decision, but spoke of the risk of "certain damages." In the resolution from the meeting of the Central Committee at the beginning of the year it was said that the situation requires that "defense resources be strengthened in all ways." This drew attention. We have now seen another strong expression of the influence of the Soviet military within the power apparatus.

9/87 0301/200/2529

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE-ZONE PROPOSAL

NORWAY'S STAND ON NWEZ PROPOSAL, NATO COMMITMENT EXAMINED

Stockholm VART FORSVAR in Swedish Apr 8, pp 13-14

[Article by Arne Olav Brundtland, scientist in the Norwegian Foreign Policy Institute and columnist in a number of daily newspapers: "Norway: Relations With Allies Comes Before Creation of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone"; first paragraph is VART FORSVAR introduction]

[Text] At the time the former Finnish president Urho Kekkonen's plan for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Nordic countries was put on the agenda one could count on every Norwegian Government to reject a proposal for a zone bound by treaty. The reason for that was in reality that Danish and Norwegian freedom from formal binding in nuclear-weapon policy was seen as an important security policy option which contributed to stability, not just in Norway but also in the Nordic countries.

It is not so today. The proposal for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Nordic countries which was launched in October 1980 represents a desire to raise the nuclear weapon threshold in Norwegian security policy in the same way as the threshold was reduced--purely politically--with Norwegian participation in NATO's dual decision of 1979 (concerning basing medium-range nuclear weapons in West Europe).

I believe it is important to clarify the duality of the problem surrounding nuclear weapon policy in making future decisions.

We have not succeeded in solving the question of what type of zone should be implemented. I myself believe that it is difficult to imagine such a zone without Danish, Swedish and Finnish participation. One can have mixed opinions about the necessity of Iceland's participation. From a general political standpoint it is difficult not to have Iceland participate. But from a purely military strategic standpoint one can imagine solutions which do not include Iceland because of the country's remoteness from Scandinavia.

The most important military-strategic objectives in the Nordic countries are considered to be the coast of North Norway and the Baltic exits. Theoretically one can imagine--from a Norwegian perspective--a zone which does not include Denmark. A Nordic zone without Sweden, however, appears

impossible. From the Swedish viewpoint, they will presumably want Denmark to participate.

Finnish-Swedish Zone

The alternative of establishing a solely Finnish-Swedish zone has been debated, but rejected.

As a result of the unity among the Nordic countries and their foreign ministers during the meeting in August 1986 it now appears that the zone question will get a lot of attention at the foreign minister meeting in March. A mandate is expected for a detailed investigation by senior officials. The intent will be mostly to get serious work underway so that the Nordic countries can agree on how such a zone will be formed.

As far as Norway is concerned there are two conditions that must be met.

1. A part of a broader European arrangement.

Here Norwegian politics has used two different formulations:

The Labor Party believes that a Nordic zone should be part of a broader European solution to reduce nuclear weapons in both East and West.

This condition has a still stricter interpretation by the Conservative, Christian People's and Center Parties (the former government coalition). For these parties it is important that Norway not act on its own outside NATO solidarity.

2. Consistent with Norwegian NATO policies.

First and foremost a zone must be accepted by non-Nordic NATO members as a functioning security policy arrangement. It is uncertain whether a zone arrangement would be consistent with NATO's strategic doctrine of flexible response. The doctrine is of course based on the idea that one will not renounce the possibility of using nuclear weapons in an early phase.

But as long as those within NATO do not insist that the principle of forward defense applies the same way in each member country, we can then imagine a certain softening of opinions toward a Nordic zone.

The Labor Party is more actively trying to get the members of the alliance to accept a policy for a Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone. The nonsocialist opposition--and especially the Conservative Party--is more ready to listen to viewpoints from Norway's allies.

Colding Committee

The Colding Committee, which worked out a report for the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, has advocated that nuclear charges on board ships in contiguous waters should be included in a zone arrangement.

In order that this will survive, inspections are needed with the help of the major powers and the allies, something which clearly shows how problematic it is to imagine an isolated Nordic solution to the zone idea.

Another problem area which was brought out in the Colding Report is the relationship to the importance of strengthening conventional weapons. If one can turn away from nuclear weapons, making them impossible to utilize in war as a limited and politically rational weapon, the idea returns that war is a continuation of politics by other means.

Then the importance of conventional forces which the Warsaw Pact can release against the Nordic area increases. From this it follows that a better conventional balance must be found in the area, and that also demands that the East reduce its conventional forces. This problem must be further investigated in connection with a future Nordic report.

Achieve Results

Perhaps it is more important to maintain a process rather than achieve results. Finland's handling of the zone idea over two decades implies this. Norway has said that the zone discussion can be a confidence-building measure in itself.

It is clear that the question of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Nordic countries is related to East-West relations and the situation within NATO.

Advances in non-Nordic disarmament and reduction of tensions mean that zone ideas will be easier to put through. But it is paradoxical that such European developments make a Nordic zone less relevant.

It is clear, however, that there will be no isolated zone under current international conditions and with the composition of the existing Norwegian government. But one should not ignore the two main conditions--a broader European relationship and consistency with Norwegian NATO policy--which were behind the launching of the idea in Norwegian politics in October 1980.

Isolated Solution

The risk of an isolated solution, or of repudiation of the two main conditions, can arise if the general disarmament problem becomes more difficult. Former Foreign Minister Knut Freydenlund said in his report to the Storting in December 1986 that after Reykjavik we stand at a crossroads in disarmament policy. There are similar thoughts in Swedish Government circles.

The problem, however, is whether the idea of an isolated Nordic zone is going to look interesting the more complicated the long term disarmament perspective becomes.

In such a situation perhaps one would believe that the Nordic countries should show the way and utilize the only available possibilities. But in such a situation the problem is that countries such as Norway and Denmark feel obliged not to risk their security policy relations with their allies. If

relations with the allies are perceived as threatened because of continued active work for a Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone, those working in Norwegian security policy--entirely independent of the government constellation--will be forced to give priority to considerations of Norway's non-Nordic NATO allies.

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[10:41] Villa, Vannathu, 13 May (AP).--The Solomon Islands is to sign the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, despite reservations about its effectiveness, a government spokesman said Wednesday.

The spokesman told AGENCE FRANCE PRES by telephone from the Solomon's capital of Honiara that Prime Minister Ezekiel Alobau would sign the treaty of Terotonga 4 June in Suva.

The Solomons was one of three South Pacific forum members which had not signed the treaty protocols. The others are Vanuatu and Tonga.

The spokesman said that the three states had considered the treaty, which binds signatories not to develop, test or store nuclear weapons in the South Pacific, in 1966.

He has reservations about the treaty, but we are fully committed to a nuclear free Pacific, the spokesman said.

he said that it was up to Vannote and Tonga to decide whether they too would sign, but added that 'we think they should.'

Manitoba Government officials were unavailable for comment.

Mr. Meleban announced his government's decision at a cabinet meeting Tuesday.

It was reported Wednesday by the state-owned Solomon Island's broadcasting corporation, which was monitored here.

The Solomon's joins as a signatory to the South Pacific Forum sponsored treaty Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Cook Islands, Tuvalu, Kiribati, Niue, Western Samoa, Tonga and Papua New Guinea.

China and the Soviet Union have signed the treaty, but the United States, Britain and France, which recently detonated another nuclear device at its Mururoa Atoll test site in the Pacific, have declined.

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

BRIEFS

JAPANESE CITY PROTESTS SOVIET TESTS--Nagasaki, April 20 KYODO--The city of Nagasaki, victimized by an atomic bomb during World War II, sent a letter to Soviet Ambassador to Japan Nikolay Solovyev Monday, blaming the Soviet Union for Sunday's underground nuclear test in the Soviet Ural mountains. The letter said that repeated nuclear testing will only lead to disastrous competition (among superpowers) to develop nuclear weapons. "We demand that the Soviet Union take initiative to explore ways to obtain arms control and world peace in negotiations with the United States," it added. The letter marks the 10th letter of protest that Nagasaki has sent to a superpower this year. [Text] [Tokyo KYODO in English 0553 GMT 20 Apr 87 OW] /6091

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RELATED ISSUES

TASS REPORT ON END OF UN DISARMAMENT COMMISSION DEBATE

Moscow APN DAILY REVIEW in English 8 May 87 pp 1-3

[TASS item: "Disarmament Commission Finishes General Debate"]

[Text] New York, May 7, TASS--The session of the United Nations Commission on Disarmament finished general debate, which had shown the growing world resolution to start practical disarmament, nuclear in the first place.

In that context, many delegations spoke for the Soviet-American agreement on medium-range Euromissiles to be concluded without delay as starting point for nuclear disarmament; the first understanding to demonstrate that the arms race escalation can be stopped.

To reverse ominous trends, all have to profoundly realise how imperative it is to use new thinking in tackling the involved security issues.

A. Bessmertnykh, USSR Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and head of the Soviet delegation at the session, stressed. To use new thinking means to display intellectual daring, revise stale cliches, open them to doubt from today's viewpoints and reject them if necessary.

It is no less imperative, as we see it, to understand that all states, big and small, socialist and capitalist, nuclear and non-nuclear, aligned and non-aligned, can do their bit to solve these tasks. As Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, emphasised, contemporary world is interdependent enough to be compared to a team of mountain climbers on a steep slope. Nations may either go on mounting to the summit or fall into the precipice together, tied with one rope as they are.

The Soviet representative went on to stress the inner logics of the Soviet stance on the issues of nuclear disarmament and prevention of the space arms race. He also directed the attention of the gathering to the latest Soviet proposals on questions the commission was tackling. The Security Council could be instrumental in elaborating practical nuclear disarmament measures, he said. In particular, a special Council session could be convened to discuss stopping the nuclear arms race and starting nuclear disarmament.

The advanced Soviet stance on limiting naval armaments and proliferating confidence-building measures to seas and oceans envisages, in particular,

our country's readiness to intruding—together with the United States and other nuclear powers, and on a mutual basis—practice or announcing the absence of nuclear weaponry on board their warships in the nuclear-free sea zones as mutually agreed upon. More than that, the issue of preventing terrorism, piracy, etc. could be discussed in the framework of resolutions on guaranteed sea route security, as to diplomatic and military technical measures of confidence and increase of peace at sea.

The Soviet representative reaffirmed the USSR's readiness for a proportionate reduction of the military budgets, for beginning specific talks on this subject. The importance was stressed of the fact that the Commission is starting to discuss, for the first ever time, issues relating to conventional arms and verification.

The UN Commission on Disarmament can make a considerable contribution to the elaboration of common approaches to principles, methods and means of control because reliable all-embracing verification is an integral part of all efforts to carry out confidence measures and reduce armaments. It is bound to become a major guarantee of an all-embracing system of international security, of strength of its foundation in the military sphere.

Taking into account the role of verification as a major means of ensuring stability and security, the Soviet delegation submitted, proposed to hold in 1988 in the USSR, within the framework of the world conference for disarmament, a conference of representatives of the public, of non-governmental organisations specially devoted to control of compliance with the observance of the agreements on the limitation of arms and on disarmament.

Standing for intensifying the work system of consideration of the disarmament issues and for putting it on a broader footing, the Soviet Union holds the view that completion of the seminar and by the Commission of specific recommendations and practical solutions to the role of the United Nations in this sphere would contribute to this.

It is very important to find a correct, harmonious combination between the national interests and the interests of setting up an all-embracing system of international security, the basis of the Soviet delegation stressed. It is not at all easy to rise above the narrowly understood interests, specifically class, bloc and state ones, and to direct the efforts to creating a collective interest—survival. But this should be done.

(IZVESTIYA, May 7. In full.)

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RELATED ISSUES

SOVIET BOOK ON ARMS RACE REVIEWED

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHNARODNYE OTHNOSHENiya (World Economy and International Relations) 1986 (signed to press 18 Nov 86) pp 141-74.

[1. Semeyko review: "Acute Global Problem"]

[Text]

The book in question (1), which was prepared by a group of authors in the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economy and International Relations within the framework of the Scientific Council for Study of Problems of Peace and Disarmament (Candidate of Historical Sciences A.D. Vlasov, executive editor), examines from current standpoints the most varied aspects of the arms race--political, military-technical and economic. Also examined in dialectical unity are the interconnections, which makes it possible to give a convincing picture of the threat looming over the world as a whole and individual regions thereof. This is particularly valuable since consideration of the interconnections in the arms race is becoming increasingly important. There is a connection between nuclear and space-based arms (the development of space "shield" would make for a sharpening of the nuclear "sword" and the latter would lead to an increase in the "shield"); between nuclear and conventional arms (both their increasingly great comparability in terms of their destructive potential and the increased likelihood of the growth of a conventional war into a nuclear war here); and, finally, between the arms race and disarmament (the first makes the second increasingly difficult, and in a number of cases, impossible).

The group of authors faced an exceptionally complex task: analyzing with regard for the latest material, the process and trends of the arms race not so much in the past as in the present and, possibly, in the future, if prevented, a buildup of military arsenals is not possible. It is for this reason that the first chapter even sets the tone of the entire book, revealing the political and military-technical singularities of the situation which is taking shape in connection with the attempts of imperialism, American primarily, to break up the military-strategic balance in the world.

1. "Gonka vooruzheniy: prichiny, tendentsii, puti prekrashcheniya" (The Arms Race: Causes, Trends, Ways of Curtailment). Moscow. "Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya", 1986, pp 304.

the active "nonacceptance of the very fact of military-strategic balance and the endeavor to disrupt it at any price and achieve American strategic superiority are now the core of the entire military policy and strategy of leading circles of the United States and the whole NATO bloc and the main political factor spurring the arms race" (p 10)--such is the work's key proposition. It explains the paradox of the end of the present century: in a world supersaturated with means of extermination capable of destroying everything living, a new stage of the arms race which is unprecedented in terms of scale and qualitative features is maturing. Its essence lies in the use of the latest achievements of the S&I revolution in all components of military power. The goal which American imperialism is setting here is to achieve the unilateral capacity for delivering a disarming and decapitating strike as swiftly as possible.

The arms race is analyzed in the book not only in the plane of specific indicators in such spheres as nuclear weapons, space-based strike arms and conventional arms but also through the prism of the military-strategic concepts and military policy of the United States as a whole. As far as actual data are concerned, they are not only extraordinarily abundant quantitatively but also highly valuable from the qualitative viewpoint: for this reason the book may perfectly well be used as a quality reference. The authors' conceptual approach to determination of the role and place of the logistical base of war in Washington's military-doctrinal tenets and in its actions pertaining to the use of force to achieve the outlined goals makes a very favorable impression also.

The analysis of the American plans in the sphere of nuclear and space-based weapons is united in the book in question by the following task: showing on the basis of specific facts and figures, the United States' endeavor to acquire first-strike capacity not only by a buildup of the "counterforce" combat potential of strategic offensive arms but also the creation of means of a broad-based antimissile defense, which would in fact perform primarily offensive aggressive functions. The authors succeeded in accomplishing it. Such a political and military-technical illustration of the plans for the creation of a strategic offensive-defensive symbiosis gives the reader a clear idea of the very essence of the new stage of the arms race being developed by the United States. We would note in passing that it is hardly advisable to reduce this essence merely to the computerization and upgrading of control systems (p 14). Electronics are rather the key to the Pandora's box than what goes into it. Constituting the latter are the latest means of destruction capable of delivering a first strike in the nuclear-space sphere, and in the conventional arms sphere, of hitting the target with the first round. The material of the book is convincing testimony to this.

The proposition concerning the fact that the "ongoing quantitative growth and qualitative changes in conventional arms are not only taking them beyond the limits of the 'conventional' concept but also creating conditions for the accomplishment with their help of tasks of strategic significance, even without the use of nuclear weapons" (p 188) is valid. Conventional ammunition of great destructive power with high accuracy and great range is a serious threat. Instead of the hundreds of pieces of ammunition once required to hit an important small target, one-two guided missiles or bombs are now

sufficient. In addition, it is becoming possible with one operational-tactical missile to destroy 10-15 targets, tanks, for example (p 105).

Increasingly great significance is being attached to the latest conventional arms, as to general forces as a whole, in Washington's military-political and strategic plans, to which testify the "air-land battle" and "Rogers Plan" concepts, which provide for the spatial expansion and growth of the scale of the use of the firepower of conventional forces for the purpose of active offensive operations to great depth.

The work pays considerable attention to the European aspect of the arms race--both in the plane of the specific actions of the United States and NATO and from the viewpoint of the globalization of American military policy. The tune in the escalation of the arms race is being called by the United States, which pays for approximately 61 percent of NATO's total military spending. Of the approximately \$60 billion spent by the countries of the Eurogroup for military purposes, \$16.5 billion (or more than 25 percent) are spent on acquiring the latest arms in the United States, the FRG, France and Great Britain. The three latter account for 60 percent of the arms created by the West European members of the bloc (pp 116-120). These and other indicators adduced in the book are supplemented by data on such channels of the arms race as the programs of modernization of the NATO infrastructure, primarily in Europe.

Considerable attention is paid to the trend toward the spread of the militarist preparations of the United States and NATO beyond the bloc's effective geographical zone. These include plans for use of the European bases for operations outside of this zone, the formation of the RDP and coordination of the allies' operations when engaged in individual aggressive actions. It is ultimately a question of a process of the formation of the aggregate military might of imperialism, to which the discursive and interesting second chapter is devoted. The said process has gone beyond the NATO framework, acquiring in the past two decades new quantitative and qualitative parameters.

Both a unification of efforts and division of the spheres of responsibility of imperialism in the military and military-economic spheres are under way. Military-economic interaction, the book observes, "is to a considerable extent a new category, which has arisen as a result of the globalization of the military preparations of imperialism and which reflects attempts to increase military-economic pressure on the socialist countries" (p 32). It is a question here both of the NATO allies and "non-NATO" countries adhering to a pro-American policy. In 1964 the military spending of 14 such countries constituted more than 66 percent of the military spending of the West European region, and the strength of their armed forces was almost half a million men more than that of the United States' NATO allies (p 41).

Interesting material is adduced in the chapters devoted to the arms race in the Asia-Pacific region, the naval arms of the United States and the other NATO countries, the influence of militarism on the developing countries and economic aspects of the arms race. The final chapter, which is devoted to the public movement against the arms race and for disarmament, is logical and comprehensive.

The structure of the work as a whole is successful, although it has not succeeded in escaping a number of repetitions and reversals to the same question. This applies particularly to the conventional arms examined in different chapters. At the same time, on the other hand, the military-technical aspects of a number of the latest weapons (nuclear-pumped X-ray laser, railguns and means of countering missile defense) are practically unillustrated. Unfortunately, there is very little material on the plans for the modernization of the Angkorvatan nuclear potential.

In conclusion we would express the hope that the new study of a most urgent problem of the present day made by the highly qualified group of authors of the IMEMO will be met with interest by the scientific community and all who are interested in international problems.

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For more information, refer Hsiao/ Shiuh [1806 2579 3189]: "Qian Qichen on
[unclear] [unclear] [unclear]"]

Panel 2 (March 10): In the last 10 days of March, diplomats, disarmament experts, scholars, and well-known persons from many countries gathered in Beijing and held an 11th regional symposium for "The World Disarmament Campaign" in 1991. The purpose of realizing disarmament and safeguarding peace. The participants first laid their own views and held animated discussions in

The U.S. Press, or Staff reporter made a special trip to interview Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Qian Qichen and sought his comments on the present status of world peace and disarmament. [End Editor's Note]

Endemic Tree Shrews Captivated Attract Much Attention

...the... the new Soviet proposal on reduction of medium-range mis-
siles... many commentators believe that a substantive breakthrough
in the U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations is likely. Do you think so?

At the same time, the Soviet Union and the United States have put forth an identical formula on the question of medium-range missiles. The two negotiating sides agreed that there was the possibility of achieving a breakthrough and concluding an agreement. This has attracted widespread attention in the world. It is our hope that they can reach an agreement. However, we will see how things develop. It should be pointed out that the question of medium-range missiles has a direct bearing on the security of countries in Europe as well as in Asia. International security is indivisible. While the security of Europe is important, the security of Asia is equally important. We cannot agree to the idea that the security of countries in Asia can be neglected. We insist that in accordance with the same principle, there should be a simultaneous and balanced reduction of the medium-range missiles deployed in both Europe and Asia until their complete destruction.

As far as the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons is concerned, in recent years, while stating that nuclear wars cannot be won and should never be

fought, both the Soviet Union and the United States have indeed put forth a number of proposals and plans, one of which is a 50 percent reduction of strategic nuclear weapons as the first step. However, the two sides have so far reached no substantial agreement and evidently, their differences remain as serious as ever.

The Strong Demands of the Peoples of All Countries

Reporter: In the 40-odd postwar years, although a new world war has not occurred, regional conflicts and local wars have continued to be waged and the arms race has kept escalating on a global scale.

Qian Qichen: That's right. In the past 40 years—ever since the end of World War II, the world has remained in the grip of turbulence, and unrest and mankind has yet to achieve genuine peace. The arms race between the two superpowers has kept escalating worldwide. The international situation remains tense, with regional conflicts and local wars or uprisings one after another and the danger of wars still threatens world peace and security. It is precisely because of this that people all over the world are willing to sacrifice blood in various ways to safeguard peace.

The ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament should be the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all types of nuclear weapons. Let us first take a look at the reality of the nuclear armaments in the world today. As everybody knows, the two superpowers possess the largest and most sophisticated nuclear arsenals, amounting to over 90 percent of all the nuclear weapons in the world. Their nuclear weapons have long reached the level of overkill and overkill. With the piling up of nuclear weapons, the continuing arms race is not only absurd but also a mockery of human wisdom. The escalation of the arms race into outer space will trigger off its own terrifying explosion. The grim realities are that whatever their intentions, only these two have the strength and capability to launch a nuclear war. The latent possibility that world civilization will be ruined by a nuclear war or like the sword of Damocles, posing a constant threat to the peace and security of mankind.

As a Chinese saying goes: "It takes the one who has the sword to cut it off." Naturally, they must assume the primary responsibility and obligation for nuclear disarmament. The UN General Assembly at its 31st session unanimously adopted a resolution which clearly set forth the special responsibility of the superpowers and urged them to take the lead in substantially reducing their nuclear disarmaments. This fully reflected the strong desire of the world's people and the common will of the international community.

Therefore, we are of the view that the two superpowers should take the lead in immediately halting the test, production, and deployment of all types of nuclear weapons and drastically reduce and destroy all types of nuclear weapons they have deployed elsewhere inside and outside their countries to create conditions for other nuclear states to take part in nuclear disarmament. After that, a broadly representative international conference on nuclear disarmament with the participation of all the nuclear states should be held to

discuss further measures for the thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. China as a nuclear state will not shirk its responsibility and will strive to make its due contribution to this end.

Strive for the Conclusion of an International Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

Reporter: To reduce or remove the danger of a nuclear war, many countries have strongly demanded that the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons be condified in the form of law.

Qian Qichen: We have consistently advocated that all nuclear states should undertake the obligations: 1) Not to be the first to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances and 2) not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states or nuclear-free zones. And on this basis, they could move on to conclude an international convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons with the participation of all nuclear states.

An increasing number of countries are now calling for the establishment of nuclear-free zones and zones of peace. This gives expression to their just aspirations against nuclear war and for the peace and security of their own regions. We maintain that nuclear states should respect the propositions and demands of these countries and undertake corresponding obligations. As early as 1964, China declared explicitly on the very first day when it came into possession of nuclear weapons that at no time and under no circumstances would it be the first to use nuclear weapons. China has also undertaken not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states or nuclear-free zones. China has successively signed the relevant protocols to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin American and the South Pacific Nuclear-free Zone. China unequivocally supports the proposals for the establishment of nuclear-free zones in Latin America, the South Pacific, Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and the Korean Peninsula.

Reporter: It is said that China takes a noncooperative attitude toward the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. What are your comments on the argument?

Qian Qichen: This is a misunderstanding. Like many other countries, China is for the principle of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. China will not help any country develop nuclear weapons. Its nuclear cooperation with other countries is confined only to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. We hold that the legitimate rights of numerous developing countries to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should not be impaired. As for the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, it has been justly pointed out that the obligations nuclear states and nonnuclear states should assume under it respectively are imbalanced and unfair. The treaty only limits lateral proliferation and places no limits at all on vertical proliferation, namely, the continuous expansion and improvement of the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers. Many experts are dissatisfied with it. That is why China has reservations on, and is critical of this treaty.

Conventional Disarmament Should not Be Overlooked

Reporter: It seems that people have for many years stressed exclusively nuclear disarmament and seldom mentioned the necessity of conventional disarmament.

Qian Qichen: As I see it, while emphasizing nuclear disarmament, one should not overlook the importance and urgency of conventional disarmament. There is in fact an organic link between nuclear and conventional disarmament. First, both nuclear and conventional armaments are basic elements in the military might which prop up the two major confronting military blocs. Second, with the development of science and technology, conventional weapons have become increasingly lethal and destructive. Third, there is no insurmountable barrier between conventional and nuclear wars. Should a conventional war break out in certain highly developed regions, it will probably escalate into a nuclear war. Fourth, conventional armaments are also frequently used as a means to interfere in, subvert, invade or to occupy a sovereign state. In the post-war years, the use of conventional weapons in regional wars and conflicts has taken a toll of tens of millions of human lives. Fifth, military expenditures in the world every year now total nearly \$1,000 billion, most of which is spent on conventional armaments. An enormous amount of human wealth is thus wasted. One cannot but regret that enormous wealth should be devoted to the arms race when there is still starvation and poverty on earth.

Obviously, it is absolutely necessary that conventional armaments be reduced drastically along with nuclear disarmament. Conventional armaments of any country should be used only for self-defense. It goes without saying that the superpowers and military blocs which possess the largest and most sophisticated and conventional arsenals should take the lead in drastically reducing their conventional armaments. This is of crucial importance to the maintenance of world peace.

Outer Space Arms Race Should Be Checked

Reporter: Currently people are talking much about the question of an outer space arms race. What is the real situation then?

Qian Qichen: That's right. Outer space is haunted by a specter, namely, the imminent or ongoing arms race. This is in effect an extension and development of the nuclear arms race which will lead to a more complex situation characterized by a progressive escalation of the arms race involving offensive nuclear weapons defensive weapons systems. This race will further destabilize the world and increase the danger of war. Checking this race has become a most urgent task for mankind.

Outer space is the common heritage of mankind and its development and utilization should bring benefits to mankind. It is against the will of mankind for any country to develop, test, produce or deploy outer space weapons in any way. It is hoped that an international convention on the complete prohibition of outer space weapons can be concluded at an early date.

It Is Not Enough To Rely on Disarmament Alone

Reporter: Now it seems there is an argument asserting that so long as disarmament is achieved, world peace and national security can be ensured and that disarmament means everything. What are your comments on this argument?

Qian Qichen: It goes without saying that disarmament contributes to world peace and security. But it is not enough to rely on disarmament alone in preserving peace and security. World peace and national security are closely interrelated. Encroaching upon a nation's independence and sovereignty will undoubtedly jeopardize world peace. Therefore, to safeguard peace and security, it is necessary to oppose any form of interference by any country in the internal affairs of others and any form of violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of others and necessary to oppose in particular any country's using its military means to subject others to wars of aggression. This means that to safeguard world peace, it is necessary to oppose hegemonism.

Having suffered untold tribulations in wars of foreign aggression in the past, the Chinese people cherish peace and security all the more deeply. We have always maintained that all countries in the world are equal. We are opposed to the big bullying the small and the strong lording it over the weak and are opposed to the use or threat of force in international relations and interference and aggression against other countries. We are in favor of a peaceful settlement of international disputes.

It is a complicated and arduous task to check the arms race and promote disarmament. Having a direct bearing on peace and security for all peoples, it calls for concerted and unremitting efforts on the part of the people of the world. All countries, big or small, strong or weak militarily, should have the equal right to participate in the discussion and settlement of the disarmament question which should not be monopolized by a few big powers. Meanwhile, it must be stressed that any disarmament agreement should not infringe upon the interests of other countries.

At present, to maintain world peace and oppose war has been taken by billions of people as their objective and sacred duty. Only when the people all over the world take their destiny in their hands can civilization triumph over brutality, can cooperation prevail over confrontation, can war be checked, and can there be bright prospects for a lasting peace.

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